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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE TAMPER-EVIDENT DEVICE USING COUPLING
BETWEEN SUBWAVELENGTH GRATINGS
by
Ange Marie Patricia Fievre
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor Shekhar Bhansali, Major Professor
Reliability and sensitive information protection are critical aspects of integrated circuits.
A novel technique using near-field evanescent wave coupling from two subwavelength
gratings (SWGs), with the input laser source delivered through an optical fiber is
presented for tamper evidence of electronic components. The first grating of the pair of
coupled subwavelength gratings (CSWGs) was milled directly on the output facet of the
silica fiber using focused ion beam (FIB) etching. The second grating was patterned
using e-beam lithography and etched into a glass substrate using reactive ion etching
(RIE). The slightest intrusion attempt would separate the CSWGs and eliminate nearfield coupling between the gratings. Tampering, therefore, would become evident.
Computer simulations guided the design for optimal operation of the security
solution. The physical dimensions of the SWGs, i.e. period and thickness, were
optimized, for a 650 nm illuminating wavelength. The optimal dimensions resulted in a
560 nm grating period for the first grating etched in the silica optical fiber and 420 nm for
the second grating etched in borosilicate glass. The incident light beam had a half-width
at half-maximum (HWHM) of at least 7 µm to allow discernible higher transmission
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orders, and a HWHM of 28 µm for minimum noise. The minimum number of individual
grating lines present on the optical fiber facet was identified as 15 lines. Grating rotation
due to the cylindrical geometry of the fiber resulted in a rotation of the far-field pattern,
corresponding to the rotation angle of moiré fringes. With the goal of later adding
authentication to tamper evidence, the concept of CSWGs signature was also modeled by
introducing random and planned variations in the glass grating.
The fiber was placed on a stage supported by a nanomanipulator, which permitted
three-dimensional displacement while maintaining the fiber tip normal to the surface of
the glass substrate. A 650 nm diode laser was fixed to a translation mount that transmitted
the light source through the optical fiber, and the output intensity was measured using a
silicon photodiode. The evanescent wave coupling output results for the CSWGs were
measured and compared to the simulation results.
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CHAPTER I: Introduction
1.1

Overview of Diffraction, Subwavelength and Coupled Gratings

1.1.1

Diffraction Gratings

A diffraction grating is a set of periodic spaced elements or grooves, usually of the
same size, separated by a distance comparable to the wavelength of light under study. A
reflection grating is made on top of a reflective surface, whereas a transmission grating
consists of a grating overlaying a transparent surface. An electromagnetic wave or light
source incident on a grating will, upon diffraction, have its electric field amplitude,
phase, or both, modified in a predictable fashion. When the light is monochromatic, it is
diffracted into distinct diffraction orders.
In equation (1), θi is the incidence angle with respect to the grating normal, θd the
angle of diffraction (negative for transmission and positive for reflection), n1 is the index
on the incident side, n1,2 the index on either the incidence or refraction side (depending on
whether reflection or transmission is being studied), and D is the total geometrical path
difference between light from adjacent grating elements. This equation is illustrated in
Figure 1 for the transmission case.

D  n1 sin  i  n1, 2  sin  d .

(1)

The law of interference says that only when the path difference equals a multiple of
the whole wavelength λ of the light, will the light from adjacent grating elements be in
phase, thus causing constructive interference which is the grating equation illustrated in
equation (2).
m   (n1 sin  i  n1, 2 sin  d )

1

(2)

At all other angles θd, are higher diffraction orders (or spectral orders), m = 0, ±1, ±2, …,
from the diffraction grating.

Figure 1: Total geometrical path difference between light from adjacent grooves in a transmission grating

1.1.2 Subwavelength Gratings
The period of subwavelength gratings (SWGs) is smaller than the wavelength of the
incident light source. In this regime equation (2), called the grating equation, is true for
only m = 0 which is always possible, and the propagating zeroth diffraction order still
exists. Otherwise, only evanescent waves are present at the surface of the grating in the
near field region. To identify what is considered the subwavelength condition for
transmission, m is assigned the value of 1 and equation (2) is transformed into an
inequality to prevent having the first diffraction order. As a result, θd = 90o, sin θd = 1,
and we have

   ( n1 sin  i  n2 ) .
Adjusting the inequality, the subwavelength condition is represented as:
2

(3)




.
n1 sin i  n2

(4)

The parameters of subwavelength gratings can be tailored for many applications, and
SWGs have been used as polarizers [1, 2], high-reflectivity mirrors [3-5] and antireflection devices [6, 7]. They have also been applied towards biosensing [8], guided
optics [9], optical couplers [10], apertureless microscopy [11, 12], nanoelectromechanical
devices [13], and in nanoscale measurement [14].

1.1.3 Coupled Gratings

GLASS

SILICON

a)

b)

c)

d)

Figure 2: a): Plane wave source incident on coupled SWGs. Higher diffraction orders are exhibited at the
output. b) Bonded pair of subwavelength gratings. c) Simulation of CSWGs. d) simulated far-field output
intensity of the first diffraction order for different gaps between the gratings [15]
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In [14], Rogers, et. al demonstrated the use of SWGs for measuring nanometer
displacement of a MEMS accelerometer by coupling two subwavelength gratings
wherein the second grating recoupled the non-propagating evanescent waves generated
by the first grating into propagating light visible in the far field, as shown in Figure 2.
The output intensity of the coupled light correlated to the distance between the two
gratings.

1.2

Research Purpose
The picometer displacement resolution demonstrated in coupled SWGs [15] showed

potential in investigating such structures for non-destructive bonding integrity evaluation.
The value of this technology emerges from its facilitation of device testing, especially
after fabrication and packaging.
This optical implementation circumvents the misalignment challenges that would
necessitate bulky positioning equipment [16]. This is accomplished by the use of an
optical fiber as delivery medium, as seen in Figure 3. A microlens could be fabricated
directly on the input fiber facet to facilitate coupling with an external laser [17]. The first
grating of the coupled pair is milled directly on the output fiber facet and once placed in
the security system, the relative position of the coupled gratings is fixed. Any attempt to
open, alter, or invade the device will result in the separation of the CSWGs, causing the
EW coupling to be lost: this is the tamper evidence verification component of this
proposed work. In Figure 3(a), tampering is evident by visibly observing far-field
diffraction transmitted through a bottom optical window. If far field diffraction is present
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the device is intact and has not been tampered with. This is due to the complexity of
aligning and coupling SWGs with less than a 1 µm gap separation.

a)

b)
Figure 3: a) In-package implementation of CSWGs chip security system. b) On-chip implementation of the
system

In another implementation, shown in Figure 3(b), the output of the coupled gratings
is captured through a top optical window by reflection. As a result of the diffraction angle
being much larger than the acceptance angle, the higher orders of diffraction do not reenter the optical fiber. The layer of reflective material is located above the protected chip,
also providing an additional barrier of protection against physical intrusion. Both
5

approaches allow nondestructive inspection without the need to open a sealed package
and are integrated into the fabrication process.

Figure 4: Two instances of varied CSWGs generate two different signatures, while the first and second
diffraction order are clearly visible

Engineered defects can also be combined with the physics of CSWGs to create
“fingerprints” for device chips, and allow verification of identity in addition to tamper
evidence. In contrast to previously developed coupled gratings featuring fixed periods in
each grating [14], a local random variation can be introduced in one of the gratings
making up the system. This slight variation of one of the grating patterns in the pair of
coupled gratings differentiates this specific set of gratings from another one, while the
general output of each system remains essentially the same. This feature translates into
variations in the intensity pattern of transmitted waves, distinguishing one device from
another, as displayed in the simulations results in Figure 4. This complete solution

6

provides both tamper evidence and authentication, which places it forward from the
currently used DNA taggant [18].

1.3

Dissertation Organization
A brief overview of transmission gratings, subwavelength gratings and evanescent

wave generation followed by the research purpose is presented.
Chapter II provides a background on the step-index optical fiber component used in
this project, as well as the context in integrated security research motivating this project.
In Chapter III, Finite Difference Time Domain (FDTD) simulations, fabrication
methods and test procedure used in this research are presented.
Chapter IV discusses in detail the FDTD simulation results for the various types of
subwavelength and coupled subwavelength gratings.
In Chapter V, SW grating fabrication is presented in detail.
Chapter VI concludes with the test setup and physical testing of the coupled
subwavelength gratings. Also, this chapter presents a comparison of the simulated and
measured results of the coupled subwavelength gratings, and outlines future work on this
novel security technique.
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CHAPTER II: Background and Motivation
In this section, the principles of waveguides and of optical fibers, which are a critical
constituent of the proposed device, will be discussed. Additionally, the motivation for
this research is stated and comprehensive background review of integrated security
research is presented.

2.1

Background on Optical Fibers

2.1.1 Dielectric Waveguides
Simply stated, optical fibers are waveguides. The principle of dielectric waveguides
can be explained referencing the slab waveguide, in Figure 5. The refractive index of the
central region, or core, is greater than the cladding material, and is able to capture light.
This difference in the indices of refraction of the core and cladding creates a condition
called total internal reflection (TIR) explained below.

Figure 5: The slab waveguide, two-dimensional waveguide. The y-dimension extends to infinity

8

When a wave is incident at an angle θ1 on the dielectric boundary from the higher
index side, the refracted ray in the low index medium leaves at an angle θ2, related to the
incident angle by:
 ncore

sin 1  .

 ncladding


 2  sin 1 

(5)

If θ1 is smaller than a critical angle given by
sin  c 

ncladding
ncore

(6)

we have the situation illustrated in Figure 6:

Figure 6: Case of light transmitted from a denser to a less dense medium, when θ1 < θc. The refracted ray in
the low index medium leaves at an angle θ2

However, if θ1 exceeds the critical angle, sin θ2 will be greater than 1, and θ2 will be
imaginary. The ray will not refract at the interface and the light will be trapped within the
high index medium as illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: In a waveguide, light is launched so that θ1 exceeds the critical angle, and total internal reflection
imprisons the ray inside the core

In order to satisfy the boundary condition, there will still be evanescent waves in the
cladding, propagating close to the core, parallel to the waveguide, and decaying
exponentially in the direction orthogonal to the boundary as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: The evanescent wave travels along the separating surface, parallel to the waveguide
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When the electromagnetic wave is passing through a waveguide, the electric and
magnetic fields present a quantity of modes, or permitted patterns, determined by the
dimensions and the indices of refraction of the waveguide. The modes will be discussed
further using the electromagnetic wave theory. Maxwell's equations [19] give a
mathematical explanation of the propagation of electromagnetic waves, or light. In
differential form, these equations can be expressed as follows when we are considering a
source-free, linear and isotropic medium [20]:

 B
 E 
,
t


(7)



D
,
 H 
t




  B  0,


  D  0.

(8)

(9)
(10)




E (V/m) and H (A/m) are the electric and magnetic fields amplitudes; D (C/m2) is

the electric displacement vector or electric flux and B (T) is the magnetic flux or

magnetic induction, defined as




D   E,




B   H.

(11)
(12)

where μ = μ0μr and ε = ε0εr. ε0 is the electric permittivity of free space (8.8541 x 10-12
F/m2), εr is the relative electric permittivity or dielectric constant of the material, μ0 is the
magnetic permeability of vacuum (4π x 10-7 H/m2) and μr is the magnetic permeability of
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the material. We will limit ourselves to substances that are neither absorbing nor
amplifying so that ε is real.
By manipulation of equations (7) to (10), the simplification of this system in terms of
the electric field amplitude is:


2E
 E   2  0 .
t
2

(13)

Equation (13) is called the “wave equation”. It can also be obtained in terms of the
magnetic field amplitude:


2H
 H   2  0 .
t
2

(14)

In a Cartesian coordinate system, we can separate equations (13) and (14) into three
components, and solve for each of them. A valid solution of (13) will be:


 

E i ( r , t )  E 0i exp( j k  r ) exp( jt )  const

(15)



where i represents the ith component, r (units of | r |: meters) the position vector, ω


(units: radians/second) the angular frequency of the wave, and k (units of | k |:

radians/meter) the wavevector, pointing in the direction of propagation of the wave. The
magnitude of the wavevector is the amount of phase adding up as the wave passes
through a unit distance and is expressed as

2n
k = |k | =
= ω2εμ.



n=

r r

(16)
(17)

is the index of refraction (unitless) of the medium and λ (units: meters) is the wavelength.
For nonmagnetic materials, μr = 1, so (16) and (17) become

12

k = ω2εμ0,

(18)

r .

(19)

n=

Equations (7) to (10) are applicable for regions of continuous physical properties.
However, in the waveguide case, different materials are present, and when the properties

  

of the material change suddenly, E , H , B, and D must comply with a certain number of
boundary conditions, that we will specify below. The instance where the interface is
planar is illustrated in Figure 9. Indices 1 and 2 indicate parameters related to medium 1

and 2 respectively, where n is the normal to the interface.

The tangential components of the electric and magnetic fields are continuous [20]:
 
 
n  E1  n  E 2

(20)

 
 
n  H1  n  H 2 .

(21)

Figure 9: Discontinuity in material properties. When the properties of the material changes suddenly,
   
E , H , B, D must comply with a certain number of boundary conditions: continuity of the tangential
components of the electric and magnetic fields, continuity of normal components of the electric and
magnetic fluxes
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The normal components of the electric and magnetic fluxes are continuous:
 
 
n . D1 = n . D2 ,

(22)

 
 
n . B1 = n . B2 .

(23)

With non-magnetic media, equation (23) simplifies to
 
 
n . H1 = n . H 2 .

(24)

Electromagnetic waves being transverse, the electric field, dependently of its
direction, can be decomposed into Transverse Electric (TE) or Transverse Magnetic
(TM). The TE field has no component along the z-axis and is perpendicular to the plane
of incidence containing the normal to the interface and the k vector. In the TM case, the
electric field is parallel to the plane of incidence (Figure 10).

Figure 10: The modes can be categorized in terms of Transverse Electric field (TE) and Transverse
Magnetic field (TM). The TE field is perpendicular to the plane of incidence containing the normal to the
interface and the k vector. In the TM case, the electric field is parallel to the plane of incidence
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When describing the propagation of a wave, we need to consider two important
parameters: β, the longitudinal wavevector or longitudinal propagation constant, which is
the propagation coefficient along the direction of propagation of the electromagnetic
wave, which we chose to be z, and κ, the transverse propagation constant. They are
expressed as
β = k cos θ ,

(25)

κ = k sin θ

(26)

where k is the wavevector introduced earlier, and θ, which can only take certain discrete
values, is the incidence angle at the core-cladding surface. Each value of θ is associated
to a mode. The relationship between the three wavevectors is shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: The geometric relation between β, κ and k. β is the propagation coefficient along the direction of
propagation of the electromagnetic wave, which we chose to be z, and κ is the transverse propagation
constant

In order to find the allowed values of θ, and the number of modes of the slab
waveguide, we will consider a wave traveling inside the slab (Figure 12).
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Figure 12: Light rays traveling inside a slab waveguide. For the propagation to continue, the interference
between the rays must be constructive

The light subjected to TIR is reflecting throughout the core of the fiber. At reflection
points, the wave accumulates a different phase with respect to the incident ray, and there
is interference. For the propagation to continue, this interference must be constructive,
which implies that the phase difference between points A and C must be m x 2π, where m
is a positive integer. If the phase change at reflection is φ, because of the two reflections
at A and B we have 2φ between the points A and C . So the waveguide condition for
propagation will be:
k (AB + BC) - 2φ = m x 2π

(27)

k (2d cos θ) - 2φ = m x 2π,

(28)

or

and results in
2n  d



cos θm - φm = mπ .
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(29)

For each m, there is a θm and a different interference pattern. Each of these field
patterns is called a mode with the corresponding mode number m. The smaller the angle
θ, the higher the order of the mode will be. The order number indicates how many zeros
the field has across the fiber for that mode.
The slab waveguide structure does not vary in the z-direction, and it is assumed that
its length L >> λ0, which is the free space wavelength. The spatial index of refraction
distribution comes to be
n (x, y, z) = n (x, y).

(30)

In dielectric materials, n is real, so the optical energy cannot be absorbed, and a
guided wave traveling along the z-axis retains all its energy. Therefore, the electric field
for the guided wave that is a solution to Maxwell’s equations must have the form



E (x, y, z) =  (x, y) exp [j (βz – ωt)]

(31)

to ensure that the power circulation is along the z-direction exclusively. The magnetic
field has the same exp [j (βz – ωt)] dependence. Separating the components changes the
curls equations (7) and (8) to the forms:
 E z
 y  jE y  j 0 H x

E z

 j 0 H y
 j E x 
x

 E y E x

 j 0 H z

y
 x

(32a)
(32b)
(32c)

 H z
 y  j H y   jE x

H z

  jE y
 j H x 
x

 H y H x

  jE z

y
 x

(33a)
(33b)
(33c)


The slab waveguide in study presents no change along the y-direction, so ∂ E /∂y

= 0 and ∂ H /∂y = 0. Equations (32) and (33) simplify to:
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  E y   0 H x

E z

 j 0 H y
 j E x 
x

 E y
 j 0 H z

 x


 H y  E x

H z

  jE y
 j H x 
x

 H y
  jE z

 x

(34a)
(34b)
(34c)

(35a)
(35b)
(35c)

In TE modes we find only Ey, Hx and Hz field components. From equations (34a)
and (34c), Hx and Hz can be expressed as functions of Ey:
Hx  


Ey ,
 0

Hz   j

(36)

1 E y
.
 0 x

(37)

By replacing equations (36) and (37) in equation (14), we obtain a second order
differential equation for Ey:
2Ey
x

2





  0 2    2 E y 



2Ey
x

2

2Ey
x

2

 0.

 (k 2   2 ) E y

  2Ey

(38)

A solution to the above equation must be found in each dielectric region to obtain the
permitted modes. We will then make use of the boundary conditions to join these
solutions. To be contained within the waveguide, the fields must produce standing waves
inside the slab and evanescent waves outside. As a result, the following solutions are
obtained:
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for x > d/2:

Ey (x) = A exp (-γx)

(39a)

for -d/2 < x < d/2:

Ey (x) = B cos (κx) + C sin (κx)

(39b)

for x < -d/2:

Ey (x) = D exp (γx)

(39c)

where A, B, C, D are constants to be calculated from the boundary conditions, and we
designate γ as an attenuation coefficient:
γ=

 2 k2 .

(40)

Because of the symmetry of the index structure, the modes can be divided in two
groups, symmetric (cosines) and antisymmetric (sines). In a symmetric mode, the
amplitude is highest at x = 0, which is verified for C = 0. The symmetry also leads A = D.
We can then specify a symmetric mode as follows:
for x > d/2:

Ey (x) = A exp (-γx)

(41a)

for -d/2 < x < d/2:

Ey (x) = B cos (κx)

(41b)

for x < -d/2:

Ey (x) = A exp (γx).

(41c)

For an antisymmetric mode, the amplitude is zero at x = 0 and the tails are of
opposite signs. This is true when B = 0 and A = -D. Thus we have:
for x > d/2:

Ey (x) = A exp (-γx)

(42a)

for -d/2 < x < d/2:

Ey (x) = C sin (κx)

(42b)

for x < - d/2:

Ey (x) = -A exp (γx).

(42c)

The conditions that link the solutions at the boundaries are the continuity of the


tangential components of E and H and their derivatives at x = -d/2 and x =d/2.

At x = d/2 and x = -d/2, the continuity requirement for Ey gives:
symmetric TE mode:

B cos (κ

d
d
) = A exp (-γ )
2
2
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(43)

antisymmetric TE mode:

C sin (κ

d
d
) = A exp (-γ ).
2
2

(44)

Writing B and C in terms of A, the field description becomes:
Ey (x) = A exp (-γx)

for x > d/2:

for -d/2 < x < d/2 :

(45a)

 d 
exp  
 2  cos (κx)
Ey (x) = A
 d 
cos 
 2 

(symmetric TE mode) (45b)

 d 
exp  
 2  sin (κx) (antisymmetric TE mode) (45c)
Ey (x) = A
 d 
sin  
 2 

for x < - d/2:

Ey (x) = A exp (γx)

(symmetric TE mode)

Ey (x) = -A exp (γx) (antisymmetric TE mode).

(45d)
(45e)

From equation (38), we can see that ∂Ey/∂x is made continuous at the boundary, the
tangential magnetic field will also continuous as well:
symmetric TE mode:

κ B sin (κ

d
d
) = γ A exp (-γ ),
2
2

(46a)

antisymmetric TE mode:

κ C cos (κ

d
d
) = -γ A exp (-γ ).
2
2

(46b)

The equations satisfying the boundary conditions combine to give the eigenvalues
equations:
tan (κ

d

)=
2


(symmetric TE mode),

(47a)

tan (κ

d

)=2


(antisymmetric TE mode).

(47b)
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The values of β that satisfy these equations specify a discrete series of guided
modes. The cross-section of the three first TE modes for the electric field of a channel
waveguide centered at (0, 0, z) is shown in Figure 13.

Ey

Ey

Ey

Figure 13: The TE electric field patterns of the first three modes. The values of β that satisfy the
eigenvalues equations specify a discrete series of guided modes, alternatively symmetric and antisymmetric
[21]
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For the analysis of the TE modes, we needed to use only the Ey, Hx and Hz field
components. The TM modes are constituted by only the Hy, Ex and Ez field components.
The Hy field is usually derived by plugging into equation (13) the expressions of the two
other fields with respect to it, obtained from equations (35a) and (35c). The differential
equation is solved using boundary conditions.
Another parameter of interest of the slab waveguide is the effective index, defined
as:
neff =


k0

= ncore sin θ

(48)

where k0 = 2π / λ0 is the magnitude of the wavevector in free space (n = 1).
The effective index, which value is between that of the core and cladding indices
(ncladding < neff < ncore), can be referred to as an average index of the structure that
determines the velocity of the propagation of the mode. It is the component of k in the
direction of propagation. Its angle with the k vector gives the coupling angle.

2.1.2 Step-Index Optical Fibers

Figure 14: Layers of a typical optical fiber: higher-index core, lower-index cladding and external coating
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An optical fiber is composed in general of an inner glass core of higher index of
refraction, embedded in a glass cladding of lower index. A polymer jacket, also called
buffer coating, sheathes the structure. When the effective index is uniform across the core
with an abrupt decrease at the core-cladding interface as shown in Figure 14, the fiber is
referred to as a step-index optical fiber.
There exist two types of rays in a step-index fiber, meridional and skew rays. A
meridional ray goes through the fiber axis between each reflection at the core/cladding
interface and lies in plane containing the axis. A skew ray follows a helical path around
the axis, without ever crossing it. Its projection on a plane perpendicular to the axis forms
a regular polygon that can be closed or open, shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15: The projection of a skew ray on a plane perpendicular to the fiber axis forms a regular polygon

Due to its cylindrical shape, the exact solutions to Maxwell’s equations for the
optical fiber are quite complicated [22]. To summarize, the meridional rays generate TE
and TM modes analogous to the modes of the slab waveguide. Additionally, the skew
rays give rise to hybrid modes called HE and EH depending on whether the E- or Hcomponent is dominant respectively. As a result of the fiber being bound in two
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dimensions as opposed to one in the case of the slab waveguide, two integers l and m are
necessary to identify the modes.
Optical fibers used in communication have a very small index difference, and in this
case the propagating waves are almost linearly polarized. Therefore the modes can be
approximated by linearly polarized modes called LP modes, formed by the superposition
of TE, TM, EH and HE modes. In a LPlm mode, there are 2l maxima around a
circumference and m maxima along a radius as can be seen in Figure 16.

Figure 16: Intensity plot for the first six LP modes in an optical fiber [23]. LP01 is from HE11, LP0m is
from HE1m, LP1m is the sum of TE0m, TM0m, and HE2m, and LPnm is the sum of HEn+1,m and EHn1,m

Of the rays that are incident on an optical fiber, only the rays that will be subject to
TIR once inside will propagate along that fiber. The propagating rays have to enter the
fiber through an acceptance cone illustrated in Figure 17. Applying Snell’s law and
considering the maximum angle of incidence:

24



ni sin  i  n1 sin    c 
2

 n1 cos c





 n1 1 sin 2  c .

(49)

Figure 17: Acceptance cone of an optical fiber

Using equation (6),
ni sin  i 

n

1

2

 n2

2

  NA ,

(50)

which is the definition of the numerical aperture of the fiber.
As important it is to have a basic understanding of the main components of the
presented system in order to grasp its operation, it is also necessary to get a general view
on the context of this research in order to appreciate the motivation behind it. Our device
has for goal to offer a new and more effective technology for tamper evidence. Therefore,
the next section presents a background on IC security research.
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2.2

The Necessity for IC Security
The conception and manufacture of complex integrated circuits (ICs) and

semiconductor devices entails a considerable amount of time as well as sophisticated
engineering skills, which makes creating such devices an expensive activity.
Additionally, ICs can contain software encoded in memories or they can be employed for
purposes necessitating encryption in order to maintain the secrecy of valuable
information. These ICs impact numerous sectors of the semiconductor industry, ranging
from medical, to automotive, to aeronautics, to communications and to defense, which is
why their tampering (interfering with them so as to misuse, alter or corrupt them [24])
and counterfeiting (their fraudulent imitation or forgery [25]) represent a serious problem
[26]. The global investment on semiconductor research and development (R&D)
increased by 7% from $48.7 billion in 2011 to $53.0 billion in 2012 [27]. Therefore, one
can foresee an increase in tampering and counterfeiting activities resulting from
insufficient security for the related intellectual property.
Indeed, IHS (formerly Information Handling Services), a market research firm,
revealed in an April 2012 publication that the five most commonly counterfeited types of
semiconductors represent $169 billion in potential annual risk for the international
electronics industry [28]. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) stated that fake
and pirated manufactured goods will reach a total value of up to $1,770 billion in 2015
[29]. With technology and data positioned in combat zones, and original critical military
hardware replaced by counterfeits, the danger to security and safety is as a major concern
by the United States Senate Armed Services Committee [30]. Another wake-up call was
the capture in December 2011 of the US RQ-170 Sentinel surveillance drone fallen in
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Iran, with the Iranian government claiming to have extracted secret information from the
aircraft [31]. Aviation in general and medical devices both are high-risk targets because
of the potential threat to human life. The seriousness of the situation is illustrated by the
graph in Figure 18, which shows that there were four times more reported incidents
where counterfeits were confirmed in 2011 than two years before, and this number is
further increasing [32].

Figure 18: Number of suspect counterfeit electronic parts for the period 2001 to 2012, most of them
reported by military and aerospace firms in the U.S. Source: IHS Parts Management

The challenges posed by counterfeits are twofold. The first challenge is how to
protect an IC chip against piracy (unauthorized copy), so that neither its physical
structure, logical operation, nor informational content can be discovered and replicated
by a non-authorized entity. The second challenge is to verify chip integrity versus
replicas. Many surveys have been written on the subject of IC security. An early
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prominent publication, [33] provides with a taxonomy of attackers, gives examples of
non-invasive and physical attacks, and goes over governmental and commercial
protection techniques available at the time and their weaknesses. Later, [34, 35] add a
brief description of the security levels as defined by IBM (International Business
Machine) and FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard)e, place attacks in noninvasive, invasive and semi-invasive categories and also describe several defense
technologies against these types of attacks. Subsequently, [36] presents anticounterfeiting approaches and initiatives, discusses general research challenges in that
field, and describes several anti-counterfeiting methods. More recently [37, 38] give
threat models, state-of-the-art defenses and the defenses metrics for different types of
attacks, while [39, 40] classify components and counterfeit types, expose supply chain
vulnerabilities, identify avoidance and detection measures and review the associated
challenges.
This review investigates answers to the two challenges mentioned earlier: protecting
chips against piracy and verifying their integrity. This review identifies different types of
piracy methods used against ICs, the information obtained through tampering, and
different classifications of security techniques. However, a different classification is
introduced, in which the location of the protection measure, on the chip itself or in the
package, is taken in consideration. On-chip security techniques are generally applicable
only to new chips because of modifications in the design or fabrication steps. On the
other hand, package-level solutions are independent from the device and can be added to
old as well as new chips. In each category, the security goal (anti-tamper or
authentication) adds further subdivision. Additionally, this chapter presents security
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techniques that have been proposed, following the new classification, and a summary of
the research in IC security is given. This chapter is concluded with the current active
areas of research in IC security and their respective challenges are highlighted, and
amongst them a new and novel solution that addresses the requirements for popular
emerging system-on-chip technologies.

2.2.1 Types of Attacks
There are multiple approaches for counterfeiting a chip or accessing its sensitive
data. As previously mentioned [40], counterfeit integrated circuits can be old ICs that are
recycled, or new ICs that are overproduced, given false specifications or sold although
defective; a counterfeit can also be a clone (copy).
When layouts or masks are not readily available for duplication purposes, or when
critical information is located inside the device, some kind of probing becomes necessary.
Historically those means have often involved damage to at least part of the chip; hence,
they are commonly termed “attacks.” The types of attacks aimed at discovering the
workings of a device or accessing information are classified as invasive, noninvasive, or
semi-invasive by Skorobogatov and Anderson [41].
In an invasive attack, the packaging is removed in order to get immediate access to
internal components. The IC can then be studied either by microprobing or reverse
engineering. Microprobing involves placing a chip under a long-working-distance optical
microscope, whereas test signals are received and monitored by a computer. Using a
laser, the passivation layer (the inert layer preventing corrosion) is ablated or removed,
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which allows probe access to the internal signal lines [33, 35]. A focused ion beam (FIB)
can be used to etch/mill through multiple layers to access conductive lines.

After

locating the conductive line, the FIB deposits a metal, such as platinum, to connect the
signal to the surface, making it more easily accessible to larger probes [42].
In reverse engineering, the different layers of an IC are imaged using a high
resolution reflected-light microscope with camera to create a three-dimensional map of
the structure. As a result of this destructive invasion method, the IC is often rendered
unusable. However, if layers of an IC can be taken off without notably altering trapped
charges, the stored information or software contained in the IC can be revealed, and
reproduced or modified [33, 43].
With the continuing shrinkage of IC components, invasive attacks are becoming
more difficult, extremely time-consuming, and require sophisticated instruments and
skills. Conversely, noninvasive attacks constitute a lower-cost option for the attacker, as
minimal equipment is required for that type of tampering. A noninvasive attack is the
study of the IC by indirect means, also called side channels. This method generally
consists of tapping the device wires for signal or radiations as illustrated in Figure 19, or
connecting the IC to an external test circuit. Analysis of the signals coming through sidechannels has been successfully demonstrated to obtain secret keys from secure devices
easier, faster, and at lower cost than destructive attacks. Noninvasive observations can
reveal the logical functions of circuit modules [34] and obtain stored information that is
crucial for circuit functionality [44]. Additionally, there are no signs of tampering,
illustrating the danger associated with this type of attack. Common noninvasive methods
include:
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Figure 19: Side-channel attacks use information leaked during system operation. The input, the output and
the side channel information are combined to recover the secret information or key. Side-channel
information can be included in the power consumption, timing, or electromagnetic emission of the device
during the processing of secret information

(1) Collecting timing information from operations associated with security: the time
consumed by every input-output pair is recorded, whether it is a single operation or an
entire function [45, 46].
(2) Looking at current or power consumption during changes of states. Amongst
these methods, differential power analysis (DPA), extracts secret information from an
integrated circuit as this IC performs the same predictable operations, by applying
statistical correlation and error correction methods to data-dependent power traces
collected at the supply pins [47, 48].
(3) Exploiting electromagnetic radiations that leak information on different
components of a device. For one component these emanations are of various types,
depend on the operation being performed by the device, and are a result of the
characteristics of the component combined with its coupling with other neighboring
components. With sensors judiciously chosen and positioned, it is possible to obtain
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multiple views of operations [49]. This multidimensionality makes electromagnetic side
channels even more effective than power analysis, which is only cumulative [50].
A semi-invasive attack is between noninvasive and invasive attacks. It can provide
an enormous amount of information on a circuit without the cost or the time required by a
full invasive attack. It is invasive to the device packaging only, with no damage to the
passivation layer. Physical contact is not made with the internal lines and the IC remains
functional. For instance, exposure to ultraviolet light rendered security fuses on early
erasable memory and microcontrollers inoperative [34]. Other examples of semi-invasive
methods have used infrared light to provide a view through the back surface of a chip
[51], or thermal imaging to locate active areas [52], or a pico-second imaging circuit
analysis (PICA) technique to detect optical emissions from the chip [53]. Other
illustrations of semi-invasive methods are optical-beam-induced current (OBIC) [54] or
light-induced voltage alteration (LIVA) [55]; both of them utilize laser scanning to detect
the location and logic state of transistors. An outstanding semi-invasive attack is fault
injection, in which atypical environmental conditions are instigated during cryptographic
operation in order to uncover the internal states, and which can breach a circuit faster
than noninvasive attacks [48, 56-58]. Fault injection employs power tampering, short
clock signals, large temperature variations, external electromagnetic fields, and light
attacks such as pulsed lasers or ultraviolet lamps [59-64] to alter the state of chosen
transistors in the IC, allowing a pirate to figure out the operation of the IC and ways to
bypass its security features.
Invasive, noninvasive and semi-invasive attacks are conducted on devices that have
been already built. Another threat exists due to the worldwide distribution of
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IC

production currently, and the involvement of often untrusted contractors. This makes it
possible for a malicious party to modify or insert stealth components in a circuit during
any step of the supply chain. These rogue components will either disable the IC, cause it
to behave differently or allow stealing information under specific conditions that will not
happen during standard simulations and post-manufacturing tests. This type of attack is
termed hardware Trojan [58, 65-73].
To summarize, the main features of the four types of attacks described above are
compared in Table 1. Ideally, an anti-tampering device would not only be impervious to
all four, but it would indicate if any attack were attempted against it. A desired feature
that would allow a legitimate examiner to confidently ascertain that an IC is not a
counterfeit would be continued improvement in device integrity. However, in a nonideal
world, ideas for a completely tamper-proof and authenticatable IC are often well ahead of
the technological means available to create such device, which is why security methods
are classified according to the type of protection they offer.

Table 1: Comparison of the Main Four Types of Integrated Circuit Attacks

DEPACKAGING

PHYSICAL
CONTACT
WITH
INTERNAL
CIRCUITRY

FAST

EXPENSIVE

TAMPEREVIDENT

INVASIVE

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

SEMIINVASIVE

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

NONINVASIVE

No

No

Yes

No

No

HARDWARE
TROJAN

No

No

Yes

No

No
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2.2.2 Classification of IC Security Solutions
The number of patents filed on IC security is proof that it is a constant
preoccupation. However, there are fewer IC security techniques released to the point of
implementation in an experimental setting or for commercial or governmental purposes,
and this is evidence of the complexity of the task at hand. With the various types and
evolution of attacks, different classification approaches have been offered, in regards to
the first challenge posed by counterfeits, i.e. tamper resistance.
One system simply follows the attack classification and considers which type of
attack is being counteracted [41], based on the fact that most anti-tampering techniques
offer

a

countermeasure

against

either

invasive/semi-invasive

or

semi-

invasive/noninvasive attacks; resistance against all three types of attacks usually comes
from an integration of different solutions, each solution tackling one type of attack.
Large companies are highly targeted, and as a result put high-level solutions in place
for protection. For example IBM, a leader in security systems, lists six security levels for
electronic systems in general, according to the amount of expertise, time, and the
equipment cost necessary to break these levels of defense [74]:
1. Level ZERO: no security features; no time, no cost;
2. Level LOW: little security; inexpensive and easy attack;
3. Level MODL: security against low-cost attacks; some expertise, cost up to
$5,000;
4. Level MOD: moderate security; some expertise, time, cost up to $50,000;
5. Level MODH: advanced security; much expertise and time, cost over $200,000;
Level HIGH: security against all known attacks.
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The US government, in the more specific framework of cryptographic modules for
sensitive information, imposes the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) 140-2
standard, established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This
standard describes in increasing order four levels of security, as well as the active or
passive nature of the protection [75], and any system performing cryptographic
operations and used by the government or military must abide to it:

Table 2: Recapitulation of the FIPS physical security requisites. ([75])

SECURITY LEVEL
4

SECURITY LEVEL
3

SECURITY LEVEL
2

SECURITY LEVEL
1

GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR
ALL EMBODIMENTS

Production-grade
components (with standard
passivation).

Evidence of tampering
(e.g., cover, enclosure, or
seal).

Automatic zeroization
when accessing the
maintenance access
interface. Tamper response
and zeroization response
circuitry. Protected vents.

Environmental failure
protection (EFP) or
environmental failure
testing (EFT) for
temperature and voltage.

MULTIPLE-CHIP
EMBEDDED
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
MODULES

SINGLE-CHIP
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
MODULES

If applicable,
production-grade
enclosure or removable
cover.

No additional
requirements.

Opaque tamper-evident
coating on chip or
enclosure.

Hard opaque tamperevident coating on chip
or strong removal
resistant and
penetration resistant
enclosure.

Hard opaque removalresistant coating on
chip.
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MULTIPLE-CHIP
STANDALONE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
MODULES

Production-grade enclosure.

Opaque tamper-evident
encapsulating material
or enclosure with
tamper-evident seals or
pick-resistant locks for
doors or removable
covers.

Opaque enclosure with tamperresistant seals or pick-resistant
locks for doors or removable
covers.

Hard opaque potting
material encapsulation
of multiple chip
circuitry embodiment
or applicable Multichip
Standalone Security
Level 3 requirements.

Hard opaque potting material
encapsulation of multiple chip
circuitry embodiment or strong
enclosure with removal/
penetration attempts causing
serious damage.

Tamper detection
envelope with tamper
response and
zeroization circuitry.

Tamper detection/ response
envelope with tamper response
and zeroization circuitry.

Level 1, the lowest level of security, requires typical passivation methods, for
example a seal (protective) layer to counter environmental or other physical damage;
Level 2 enhances the physical security of Level 1 by making tamper evidence of the
seal mandatory;
Level 3 intends to stop an unauthorized party from obtaining access to key security
parameters stored inside the module, for example, by placing the module in a solid,
opaque, hermetic enclosure to discourage access to the contents or ensuring that
tampering will destroy the module;
Level 4 offers the highest level of security. It calls for active anti-tampering
technologies or a combination of passive and active tamper-resistant layers. With active
anti-tampering, a targeted IC will take some action when subjected to any suspicious
activity. This event can be environmental conditions or variations outside of the normal
working ranges of the module, such as voltage, photon detection, acceleration, strain,
temperature, chemical reactions, or proximity. Typical reactions are erasure or
destruction. Level 4 mechanisms are particularly helpful in physically unguarded settings.
Another system of classification is proposed in Figure 20. In a first division, it
considers the location of the countermeasures. This organization stems from the fact that
protection can be implemented in the device packaging or, more intimately, added to the
chip. In order to integrate both challenges posed by counterfeits, authentication is
included in addition to tamper resistance, and the security solutions are further partitioned
according to which challenge they address. The following examination of IC security
techniques uses this classification approach.
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Figure 20: Security classification based on location and goal of the protection
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2.2.3 IC Security Techniques
A. Chip-Level Security
A.1 Anti-Tamper
One of the first security issues tackled by IC manufacturers was attacks against
erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROM). To prevent unauthorized access,
they placed security fuses shielded by a metal cover opaque to ultraviolet light. The
objective was to make the fuses hard to find and if found, difficult to manipulate by a
pirate. In electrically erasable programmable read-only memories (EEPROM), inverted
memory cells were made more resistant to UV light. Furthermore, to counter wellequipped and highly skilled entities that could resort to laser cutting or FIB machines to
take away the protective metal, multiple fuses would be placed at different locations. This
would affect the data contained in the memory and make it useless [35].
Some researchers have proposed changing the characteristics of the circuit elements.
For example, FIB implants could reduce the switching speed of chosen logic gates,
making the usual low speed test methods useless in establishing their correct logic
functions [76, 77]. Also largely suggested has been camouflage. One example would
make analog components look like digital components and hide the former amongst a
digital IC [78]. Another illustration would be to configure false interconnection contacts
in read-only memory (ROM) devices or in flash memory cells [79, 80]. In other
instances, a lightly doped density (LDD) region called "channel block" would be placed
between the active areas, where the dopant type of the channel block would determine if
there is connection or not. However, the density would be so small that usual reverse
engineering methods would not discover the presence or polarity of the implants [81-83].
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These connections would not be made of metal wires, but instead they would be buried,
making surface etch necessary [84-87]. Also, fake apparent metal connections and
nonworking transistors looking like real ones would mislead a reverse engineer [88-94].
Another example uses fake features isolated by invisible etch stop films [95]. These
methods do make reverse engineering harder by forcing the attacker into brute force, but
at the cost of power, area and delay overheads [96].

Security fuses, FIB implants and camouflage seek mostly to protect against invasive
attacks. On the other hand, various protection methods termed logic hardening have been
proposed at the circuit level specifically against noninvasive and semi-invasive attacks.
A method against timing attack is to make all operations take the same amount of
time [45, 68], but this is clearly at the cost of efficiency. Another technique with less
negative impact on performance and also used against electromagnetic leakage is to
blind, i.e. to modify the way a computation is conducted so that it is uncorrelated to
timing or electromagnetic radiations [45]. Other timing countermeasures eliminate cache
or modify the way data is cached [72, 73, 97, 98].
One way to counter DPA is to make power consumption constant. This can be
achieved by using gates that consume power independently of their input values, i.e.
dual-rail logic, where the logic is replicated using complement wires and gates [99-104].
An on-chip signal suppression circuit can be added without alterations to the encryption
circuitry to prevent information escaping through the current supply pin side-channel to
be acquired by differential power analysis. The total current drawn from the supply is
maintained at a defined level. Since DPA receives information resulting from variations
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in the supply current, when these variations are reduced, a pirate needs more power
samples to differentiate information from noise. The number of necessary power traces
can be made excessively large, rendering the attack very long and expensive for the
attacker [105]. These countermeasures are accomplished at the price of higher power
expenditure and larger circuit area.
Circuit-level solutions such as randomization or update of keys during computation
are used as well against timing attacks, power analysis or electromagnetic leakage. Signal
strength reduction can also be effective against both electromagnetic and power analysis
attacks [106].
A great deal of research is also aimed at counteracting fault attacks. Input parameters
are commonly protected using cyclic redundancy checks; processing parts by redundant
computation, checks on algorithm-specific properties, or blinding of exponentiation
algorithms; and program flow by a signature. In these cases the security requirements
have to be balanced with hardware or time overhead. Inherent countermeasures, such as
the choice of parameters, can also be used. These solutions are reviewed in more detail
by [107-109].
Garbled circuits promise a general solution to all noninvasive and semi-invasive
attacks, with circuit area comparable to existing countermeasures [110-115].

A.2 Authentication
The other challenge is authenticating a chip, in other words determining whether the
chip is an original or not. For that the IC has to be marked by a key that is impossible or
too costly to reproduce. Chip authentication data have traditionally been stored on
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nonvolatile memory located on the chip itself. The basic measures to prevent
unauthorized access to this information are encryption of the data and/or permanent
disconnection of the fuses leading to the section of the memory where it is written.
However, with the plurality of types of attacks available, those precautions are no
deterrent to a skilled and determined pirate, thus prompting more sophisticated methods
to encode the origin and identity markers of ICs.
One authentication method has been the adaptation of watermarking to hardware,
which means embedding authentication information in the circuitry in a manner invisible
to the user. Researchers at UCLA utilized unused portions of FPGA blocks to mark their
circuits [116]. The circuit was divided in tiles, each tile having several possible instances.
Two instances of the same tile had the same functionality and were interchangeable, but
with different layouts with marking differently located as illustrated in Figure 21. One
circuit instance was thus made up of a set of instances of diverse tiles. In this
fingerprinting technique, although timing properties might vary from one tile instance to
another, there was no effect on global performance, timing, or power consumption.
However, the technique cannot be employed for application specific designs (ASICs),
which use a single mask. A method suitable for ASICs was the assignment of a unique ID
to each chip by appending a small section to the control path that could be programmed
after manufacture [117]. Besides incorporating the unique ID into the functionality of the
IC, this technique was the first that would allow assessment of the number of counterfeits
in the event that piracy would be discovered. However, new solutions were needed that
would not be limited to meter counterfeits, but would instead prevent their creation and
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circulation. Methods allying anti-tamper with authentication at the chip level are
reviewed next.

Figure 21: Example of the use of tiling for fingerprinting, with the Boolean function Out = (A∩B) ∩
(CUD). Since the function as well as the tile interface with adjacent design components are unchanging, the
configurations shown are transposable

A.3 Anti-Tamper with Authentication
An innovative method to assign a unique ID to each IC was the Integrated Circuit
Identification Device (ICID), illustrated in Figure 22. That technique did not require any
unusual processing steps, nor was post-manufacture encoding necessary. Identical
transistors, forming an array, drove each a resistive load. Fabrication variations caused
the current passing through this load to be random, and the corresponding voltage was
converted to a bit string [118].
ICID was the first example of a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), before the
name was coined. This authentication method has been gaining in popularity for the past
decade and takes advantage of unique characteristics that are inherent to each IC. Two
identically functional instances of the same chip will have distinctive features that are due
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to uncontrollable random imperfections created during fabrication [119]. This unique
pattern is the key that identifies the chip, and cannot be duplicated. The key unlocks a
secret set of challenge (applied physical stimulus) and response (unpredictable but
repeatable device reaction), coming from an exponentially large pool of possibilities, for
authentication. In addition, any probing attempt alters the PUF’s behavior, ruining the
PUF and providing tamper evidence of invasive attack.

Figure 22: In each integrated circuit, an array of devices produces a difference voltage sequence because of
device mismatch. ICID uses these sequences of random but repeatable voltages to create unique
identifications. ([118] © 2000 IEEE)

Other examples of integrated circuit-based PUFs are silicon PUFs. The first PUFs of
this type, depicted in Figure 23, were arbiter-based PUFs where a latch determines which
of two racing signals going through a sequence of MUX stages arrived first [119, 120].
Implemented for circuit authentication, they make use of delay information as
parameters. To achieve reliability of those PUFs in environmental variations, relative
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delay comparisons are taken into account [121]. Security is further enforced by the fact
that the key is volatile and is only generated when the device is powered. However,
arbiter-based PUFs display weakness in front of model-building and emulation attacks
[122-124] and have low entropy, which limits their unpredictability [125]. Reliability
problems, like the effects of aging, also need to be resolved.

Figure 23: A basic parallel delay-based PUF is shown. The path segments are designed to have the same
delay but manufacturing variations cause the delays to differ slightly. The rising edge goes through the two
different paths and the one-bit output is determined by which path allows the rising edge to arrive faster

More reliability and simplicity were brought in a modification of the arbiter PUFs,
applicable to both Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and FieldProgrammable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) [126]. They use delay loops to generate Ring
Oscillator Physical Unclonable Functions (ROPUFs), simple circuits that oscillate with a
frequency affected by fabrication variations and hence would not be predictable, but
could still easily be established by a counter shown in Figure 24. ROPUFs have become
one of the most widespread physical unclonable functions, seeking more security and
smaller area [127-136], although the most recently proposed implementation [137] is not
universal and its structure must be adapted to the type (analog, digital, or mixed) and size
of the chip. Nonetheless, it seems that the security goal is still at a distance of being
44

achieved, as a complete characterization of arbiter PUFs was demonstrated in [138] using
backside photonic emission analysis, with the claim that this method is applicable to all
delay-based PUFs.

Figure 24: Architecture of the ROPUF

Several publications treat of SRAM-based Physical Unclonable Functions [139-153].
This compact security method takes advantage of existing static random access memory
cells (cells that hold data as long as power is supplied) that take consistently at power-up
one of two arbitrary stable states, 0 and 1. One particular memory cell arrives at a state,
always the same, determined by the manufacture process. A challenge is a subset of these
memory cells; the response is their respective power-up state. Not all FPGAs offer
uninitialized SRAM memory, and the idea is adapted with Butterfly Physical Unclonable
Functions (BPUFs) that use cross-coupled latches, do not require any power-up for
assessment, and are appropriate for all sorts of FPGAs [154]. However latch-based PUFs
are less robust to temperature variations than SRAM PUFs [125].
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In any case, settling-state-based PUFs such as SRAM and BPUFs lack the level of
security expected from a PUF, as SRAM PUFs have been characterized by FIB circuit
edit and laser stimulation, and cloned [155, 156].
More recent popular PUF developments at the chip level include the following:
(1) Glitch PUFs relying on delays, use glitches in combinatorial logic circuits [157160].
(2) Secret Model PUFs associated with physical PUFs, mimic the PUF challengeresponse activities, lessening the required amount of storage for challenge-response pairs
[161-164].
(3) Public PUFs or PPUFs, defined as “multiple-input–multiple-output systems that
are much faster to execute than they are to simulate, and whose security no longer relies
on the secrecy of their physical parameters as PUFs do” [165], can be modeled, but the
model evaluation requires much more work and time than the evaluation of the PUF itself
[163, 165-169]. The same idea appears in SIMPL systems (Simulation Possible but
Laborious systems) [170-173].
A concept completely different from PUFs, the Secure Split-Test (SST) [174]
proposes to place two blocks, a functional-locking block to guarantee that only ICs
unlocked by the intellectual property (IP) owner have correct functionality and a scanlocking block to ensure that functional results cannot be scanned out and subsequently
allow tampering with the protection hardware. In addition to the area overhead created by
the additional blocks, the multiple exchanges between the IP owner and the foundry will
add to the SST cost.
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In the particular case of recycled ICs, i.e. components that are defective or used
originals sold as new and working out of specification, the natural course of action is to
find a way to compare them to non-defective, unused chips. The absence of functional
defect is ascertained through extensive testing. Once established that an IC is fully
functional, the other parameter is its “length of service.” The circuit aging concept, first
used for reliability assessment, has been recently applied to combat IC recovery by a
research group in Connecticut. First, they proposed a comparison between two ring
oscillators, the first a reference free of stress and the second a stressed ring aging rapidly
[175]: the larger the difference between the rings frequency, the older the chip. The
effects of temperature and inter-chip process variations are filtered out by data analysis.
The two rings create minimal overhead and because they are bound to each other their
relative frequency cannot be tampered with. Next, using instead the delay distribution of
paths, the same researchers completely eliminate the area overhead [176, 177]. Indeed,
the delay distribution being within a certain range, a larger delay indicates an older IC.
This implementation is also applicable to legacy ICs and is completely tamper-proof,
since it uses inherent properties of the circuit. However, with large process variations
sufficient accuracy can be difficult to attain. A third embodiment uses counters to record
usage time and an embedded antifuse memory block to store the recorded values [178].
The memory block cannot be reprogrammed, which makes it tamper-evident.
Another group compares the aging between similar parts of one circuit to create a
signature [179], a method also applicable to legacy chips.
In the next subsection, we will consider package-specific security solutions.
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B. Package-Level Security
B.1 Anti-Tamper
Protection has been often envisioned to be added as one or several supplementary
layers, including extra circuitry for a response to tampering. For example, plates
connected together and having serpentine or meandering conductor paths on them could
be used as protective shielding against invasive or side-channel attacks [98, 180-182]. In
other models, top and metal layers could be made more difficult and slower to etch than
the passivation layer and the active circuitry [183], bonded substrates could support
memory detectors on their external face [184], or an adhesive layer covered with porous
material could send an electrical signal when torn [185]. Other examples would modify
the packaging using a molding compound in which a change in capacitance or impedance
would be detected by some circuitry [186, 187], add magnetic components to produce a
magnetic response in elements situated on the target IC [188], or place reservoirs
containing fluid chemicals that would destroy a circuit under reverse engineering attack
[189, 190]. In another solution, a conductor is tightly wound around the protected IC and
a detection circuit, all packaged together in a solid epoxy rendering the wires invisible
from the outside; the winding of two devices is not exactly the same, even though they
come from the same fabrication process [191]. However, this type of housing has the
drawback of being complicated to build and consequently expensive to produce.

B.2 Authentication
Active research has been conducted for the past few years to tag ICs with biological
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). According to its proponents, the DNA signature is
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practically impossible to replicate, is inexpensive, requires only minimal change in the
fabrication process, and is extremely accurate, the probability of a false positive
authentication being one in a trillion [18]. It consists in an ink containing shuffled plant
DNA to produce a quaternary sequence unique to each IC chip and kept in a database.
This ink also fluoresces under certain light frequencies. The product derived from this
research, SigNature® DNA, is marketed by Applied DNA Science and has been used on
microchips by the Department of Defense [192, 193]. However, DNA is known for its
sensitivity to harsh conditions [194], and the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)
has shown reluctance to accept this technology as a general IC marking solution. The SIA
does not believe SigNature DNA to be as reliable as presented, as it has not been
independently evaluated or tested on a wide variety of products of different origins [195].

B.3 Anti-Tamper with Authentication
Other package security methods are armed with protection devices offering both
tamper evidence and authentication capability.
The most widely known electromagnetic protection is probably the hologram [196],
a type of diffractive optically variable image device (DOVID), often seen on smart cards.
A hologram is a 3D picture showing different perspectives depending on its position with
respect to the viewer, in an effect called parallax. Hidden and apparent authentication
mechanisms can cohabit on a hologram. When positioned at the seal point of a package, a
hologram also acts as a tamper-evidence device. However, available instruments are able
to resolve conventional holograms in a matter of days [197, 198] and more sophisticated
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added nanoscale features, for example those operating in the near-field regime [199] will
probably be at the reach of state-of-the-art cloning apparatus as well.

PUFs, intrinsically tamper-resistant, are also used for authentication at the package
level.
An optical PUF was suggested by Pappu, made of a transparent material, in which
light scattering particles were inserted at random in the course of fabrication. When hit by
a laser beam, the device would produce a speckle pattern, and minor variations in the
location of just a few particles from one device to another would noticeably modify their
whole interference patterns. In this implementation, the challenge set would be the
position, angle amplitude and wavelength of the laser, and the response would be the
speckle pattern [16]. Although fabrication of the light scattering token itself is a low-cost
process, the depicted PUF involved pricey and sizeable equipment comprising a laser and
a precise mechanical positioning system. The relative position of the laser, token and
image sensor should be exactly the same every time the speckle pattern is recorded. Other
authors [200]; [201-203] suggested an integrated version of the optical PUF where the
incidence angle parameter would be replaced by the number of lasers that would be
turned on or by switchable display pixels in a second embodiment. However in all cases,
the smallest change in the token due to normal usage or environmental variations would
change the speckle pattern and result in a false alert.
A magnetic PUF has been applied for card authentication, taking advantage of the
noise-like permanent characteristics of magnetic stripes. The magnetic particles forming
the stripes are of different sizes and shapes, randomly assembled, and emit an unchanging
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and unique background signal [204-207]. Card readers must be adapted for the use of this
magnetic PUF, which affects its cost.
Another type of PUF for package authentication might be created using an array of
nanorods. During the development of an assembling method to form gold nanorods on a
nanostructured surface, it was noted that although the same array pattern could be
repeated, the individual nanorods varied slightly in length, orientation and separation
with the previous nanorod in the array. This translated into a shift in color and intensity in
their far-field imaging [208, 209]. Silver nanowires exhibit polarization-dependent
surface-enhanced Raman scattering, that offers covert authentication because encrypted
in the nanostructure [178].
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) labels [210] allow –as opposed to a
conventional bar code –automatic identification of a tag from a distance with no line-ofsight necessary with the reader [211-213]. The tag is an antenna/microchip assembly and
the reader is a second antenna emitting radio-frequency waves and receiving a response
signal with information from the tag. However, by itself the tag is subject to easy cloning,
which is why it is being associated with Coating Physical Unclonable Functions
(COPUFs) or delay-based PUFs [210, 214-218] to form an “unclonable” tamper-evident
RFID tag. COPUFs [219-221], which use a protection layer shielding an IC, are attractive
because of their low manufacturing cost. The coating film contains dielectric particles
that are random as to their dimensions, shape, and location. In Figure 25, metal line
sensors arranged underneath the protective layer like a comb are employed to determine
the local capacitance of the coating. These capacitances are random because of the
random properties of the particles in the coating, and constitute the responses to voltage
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challenges, each of different frequency and amplitude. Coating PUFs allow the detection
of physical tampering, as a result of changes in the local responses, as well as device
authentication. An insulating layer between the COPUF aluminum lines and the IC
underneath acts as a barrier against crosstalk between sensors and protected circuit.
However, these additional metal and insulation layers create a sizeable packaging
overhead, and because the sensors have to be constantly active, power consumption is
significantly increased.

Figure 25: Graphic cross-section of a Coating PUF IC. Aluminum sensors in the higher metal layer
measure the local capacitance of the coating

When considering systems on a chip, which we will discuss in the next section,
RFID allied to PUF does not present the best attributes for integrity solutions, because of
the opacity of COPUFs [219] and reliability issues [121] associated with delay-based
PUFs. As for holograms, available instruments are able to resolve conventional
holograms in a matter of days [197, 198] and more sophisticated added nanoscale
features, for example those operating in the near-field regime [199] will probably be at
the reach of state-of-the-art cloning apparatus as well.
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Table 3: Summary of Security Solutions
SECURITY SOLUTION
Fuses
Change of element characteristics
Logic hardening
Tiling
Post-manufacture programming
Silicon PUFs
Secure Split-Test (SST)
Aging
Shielding
SigNature DNA
Holograms
Magnetic PUF
Optical PUF
Nanorod/nanowire arrays
RFID + COPUF

PROTECTION
Counter advanced invasive attacks such as laser cutting or FIB
Makes usual invasive test methods useless
Hardens circuit against noninvasive and semi-invasive attacks
Authenticates without effect on performance, timing or power of FPGA
Allows metering when counterfeiting is discovered
Authenticate thanks to a unique volatile pattern that cannot be duplicated (or
take too long to simulate in the case of PPUF), are destroyed by physical
tampering
Guarantees that only ICs unlocked by IP owner have correct functionality and
prevents tampering with the protection hardware
Allows identification of recovered ICs, is tamper evident
Protects the IC with a tamper-proof enclosure
Offers unique sequences for authentication
Offer covert or overt authentication, are tamper-evident when placed at seal
point of package
Offers a unique fingerprint for authentication, is tamper evident
Offers a unique pattern for authentication with complex output and hard
modeling, is tamper evident
Translate into a possibly covert, unique shift in color and intensity in their farfield imaging for authentication, are tamper evident
Allows identification from a distance, no line-of-sight necessary, is tamper
evident

2.2.4 Integrity Solutions for Systems On a Chip
For the past decade there has been an increased focus on 3D Heterogeneous Systems
on a Chip (3D-HSoC) [222-235] and an explosion of wearable devices that carry a lot of
personal information [236-248]. These chips are custom-produced in small quantities and
hence carefully controlled. A usual way of inspecting them is to open the package, study
individual chips and then repackage the device for reintegration into the supply chain.
Nevertheless, with the security and privacy issues entailed with these systems, there has
been a growing recognition of the need to burry passive covert tamper-evident solutions
in packages to provide clues in the instance the initial technologies would be
compromised. The prospect of generalized use of Systems on a Chip (SOCs) and
wearable devices makes it useful to get a global view of the research directions applicable
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to the security of these types of ICs. Table 3 provides a summary of the security solutions
examined in this survey.

Figure 26: Schematic of the coupled subwavelength grating setup. Source: A.-A. Rogers, "Evanescent
wave coupling using subwavelength gratings for optical MEMS accelerometer," PhD Dissertation,
Electrical Engineering, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, 2011

A mandatory attribute for SOCs and wearable devices is compactness. However, the
most critical aspects of these chips being sensitive information protection and reliability,
it is paramount to ally anti-tampering with device authentication. A single solution
offering both security features would be preferable to respect the compactness
requirement. Additionally, it would be very convenient if one did not need to access the
IC itself to check if it has been tampered with or to authenticate it, the packaging giving
all this information. With the stealth nature of the security desired, optical means come to
mind. A few solutions using optical structures such as Fabry-Perot (FP) cavities or
gratings promise the possibility of detecting nanometer-range displacements induced in
the casing by any physical intrusion attempt. However, these systems are usually bulky
structures including servomechanism feedback loops, multiple mirrors, beam splitters,
amplifiers or differential circuits [249-254]. With the stealth nature of the security
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desired, newer optical means such as CSWGs, featuring a plain laser-gratingsphotodetector setup, shown in Figure 26, are of choice.
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CHAPTER III: Methodology
This research aims to use this CSWG method for tamper verification of electronic
chips and also for device authentication. The envisioned device will be comprised of an
encased optical system which transmits a laser source through an optical fiber that has
SWGs etched into the output facet of the optical fiber, and into a glass substrate with
SWGs of a different period etched into its surface. Computer simulations guide the
design for optimal operation of the security solution. The optical setup is demonstrated
using the optical modeling software, Optiwave™ OptiFDTD to validate the evanescent
wave (EW) coupling concept reported in this dissertation with the following
characteristic parameters: a Gaussian wave incident source with wavelength λ = 0.65 µm,
a subwavelength (SW) grating in the output facet of a silica optical fiber, and a SW
grating in a borosilicate glass substrate. The 3D design and 2D projection are shown in
Figure 27.
The period and thickness of the gratings are optimized for maximum evanescent
wave coupling efficiency, and the size of the input light beam and the number of grating
lines is established for discernible transmission of higher diffraction orders at a
wavelength of 650 nm. The gratings are fabricated on a silica fiber using focused ion
beam milling and on a glass substrate using e-beam lithography. The measured output
results are compared to simulation results.
This chapter exposes the mathematics behind our simulation software, and the
rationale for our parameters, instrumentation and fabrication methods choices.
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Figure 27: 3D design of fiber grating coupled with glass grating, and longitudinal cross-section of design in
x-z plane

3.1

Optical Simulations with Finite Difference Time Domain (FDTD)
We designed coupled regular and varied gratings, with several line width

distributions for the varied gratings using OptiFDTD, a photonics simulation software by
OptiWave [239].
The Finite Difference Time Domain (FDTD) method was initially presented by Kane
S. Yee, in 1966 [255], and is today amongst the most widespread techniques applied to
model electromagnetic problems. Yee suggested the approximation of Maxwell's curl
equations, repeated here:
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with three-dimensional central differences. Since the medium is assumed linear, the
following constitutive relations are true:



D= εE

(53)



B= μH .
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Using the differential form, we can thus express (51) and (52) as:
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To be able to use FDTD, a computational domain, or space where the calculation
will be carried out, must be chosen. The E and H fields will be established at every point
pertaining to the computational domain. Each material lying inside the computational
domain must be indicated, using the index of refraction. The simulation region must be
partitioned into "Yee Cells" in order for the FDTD method to be employed. The six field
components in each Yee cell, Ex, Ey, Ez, Hx, Hy and Hz, are separated to each other by
half a space step as shown in Figure 28.

58

Figure 28: Standard Yee cell. The six field components are separated to each other by half a space step

The time increment and the spatial discretization are bound; we can notice from (55)
and (56) that the time derivative of the E-field is determined by the curl or variation
across space of the H-field, and vice-versa. These equations are transformed into centraldifference equations and discretized to allow the numeric calculations. To facilitate
computer implementation, they are arranged so that the indexes are integers. We then
have:
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In the equations, the E and H fields are separated in time by ½ Δt intervals. The new
H field components are calculated at n + ½

from the previous field components by

means of (54a) to (54c). Then the new E field components at n +1 are determined using
(53a) to (53c). The process is then reiterated as many times as necessary in a leapfrog
manner, until the final time step is attained.
The speed of light restricts the transmission of information during a time Δt to a
distance cΔt. To avoid an unlimited increase of the calculated E and H components and
ensure the stability of the model, the so-called Courant-Freidrichs-Lewy (CFL) Stability
Criterion must be met [256]. This condition is given by:
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so that we can incorporate in the numerical approach far-away points that can impinge on
the time propagation. When this requirement is fulfilled, the grid is said to be “causally
connected.”
After the computational domain and the materials that it contains have been specified, a
source is identified. Given that the E and H fields are calculated directly, the result of the
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simulation is generally the E or H field at a point or a succession of points within the
computational domain.
FDTD allows for arbitrary model geometries and places no restriction on the
material properties of the devices. It permits the precise characterization of complex
inhomogeneous, lossy or even anisotropic material structures. As a direct solution of
Maxwell's time-domain equations, the method is a comprehensive full-wave solution
without approximations that would preclude an exact solution from being obtained.
FDTD permits to determine the fields both inside and outside a structure. In particular,
OptiFDTD allows easy generation of grating arrays using VBScript.
A disadvantage of FDTD is the fact that it demands the entire computational domain
to be gridded, and these grids must be small compared to the smallest wavelength and
smaller than the smallest feature in the model. When very large computational domains
must be used, the consequence is extremely time-consuming simulations, and this makes
arduous the modeling of long, thin features. The approach is memory demanding and
lengthy for the reason that for each spatial grid point at each time step, it collects values
and performs calculations. The translation of derivatives into finite differences causes the
wave to progress slower than its real velocity of propagation. Our approach to overcome
these limitations is to convert 3-D structures to equivalent two-dimensional models, less
demanding in memory and time. This is achieved by calculations from the effective
indexes. Similar schemes have been used before [257-261].
Finally, since the computational domain must be finite, a boundary condition must
be stated. The boundary must be at a sufficient distance from the waveguide in order not
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to diminish the exactness of the solution. The absorbing boundary condition replicates the
effect of a highly lossy material outside the boundary.

3.2

Wavelength and Components Choice
A Gaussian wave of wavelength 0.65 µm, normally incident on the gratings, was

chosen as the illuminating light source, as opposed to a longer, non-visible infrared
wavelength to permit visual inspection. The light was TE-polarized (i.e. the electric field
is parallel to the gratings).
In a physical environment, it can be a challenge to perfectly align the light source to
first grating #1 and grating #1 to grating #2. When the first grating is written directly on
the fiber facet, the fabrication process eliminates misalignment of the beam, since the
grating remains at a fixed position relative to the incident beam. The first grating was
patterned on a silica fiber and the second SW grating in a borosilicate glass wafer, both
substrates transparent at visible wavelengths.

3.3

Fabrication Methods

3.3.1 Electron Beam Lithography (EBL)
Electron-beam lithography (EBL) is a versatile method that can be used on diverse
materials to create countless kinds of patterns. The substrate is covered with a film called
a resist [262], sensitive to electrons. When a focused beam of electrons scans the resist
following the desired pattern, the solubility of the exposed regions is changed. The resist
is then immersed in a developer that will remove either the exposed or the non-exposed
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regions, depending on the positive or negative nature of the resist. The technique steps for
a typical resist patterning process are illustrated is Figure 29. Subsequent etching
transfers the shapes drawn in the resist into the substrate.

Figure 29: Steps of resist patterning in typical EBL process

EBL can create structures with resolution below 10 nm. Although aberration and
space charge play a large role in limiting resolution, other phenomena such as forward
and backward scattering as well as generation of secondary electrons also contribute.
Forward scattering is caused by elastic collision of the electrons entering the resist, which
diverts the electrons and broadens the beam. Thicker resist results in more beam
broadening, particularly at low incident energies [263]. Backward scattering is caused by
neighboring features, leaking electrons into the new features, causing the proximity effect
[264-266] broadening the image, and reducing contrast. Secondary electrons [267, 268]
are produced by inelastic collisions of the incident electrons [269]. They have low energy
and thus only nanoscale range but eventually limit the pitch resolution [270]. The use of
higher energy electrons or thinner resist can reduce forward scattering, but there is no
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way to prevent secondary electrons. The main disadvantage of this type of lithography is
its slow speed.

3.3.2 Focused Ion Beam (FIB) milling
When a sample is three-dimensional or structures are already present, the use of a
resist coating is not practical. The easiest method to create patterns in such cases is to
mill them directly on the substrate using a focused ion beam (FIB). FIB milling consists
in having the heavy ions such as Ga+ and Au+ in the incident beam elastically collide
with atoms on the sample, thus dislodging them from the substrate [271]. The escaped
atoms are either re-deposited or pumped out of the vacuum chamber. As with EBL,
inelastic collisions create photons and secondary electrons.
Since it only takes a single step, FIB is much faster than EBL and can as well create
structures down to the nanometer scale on a large variety of materials. It has been used to
fabricate lenses on fiber tips [272], microlens arrays [273], pillar microcavities [274],
stacked Josephson junctions [275], and photonic structures in diamond membranes [276,
277]. However, large doses of ions are necessary, which limits the area that can be
patterned.

3.3.3 Charging
Due to electrons and ions being charged particles, they will likely charge a
dielectric substrate because they are not able to rapidly find a path to ground. Negative
charging repels the electron beam from the charged region whereas positive charging
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attracts the electron beam to the charged region. Both produce substantial distortion
during patterning [278]. A thin conductive film over or underneath the resist, for example
a ten-nanometer thick layer of gold, gold-palladium, chrome, or aluminum, or a
conductive

polymer

like

TQV

(Nitto

Chemical

Industry)

or

ESPACER100

(polyisothianaphthenesulfonate, Showa Denko) [279, 280], will solve this issue,
providing a path to the resist with minimum scatter. The conductive coating is removed
before development. ESPACER100 can be rinsed off with water and thus can be applied
directly on numerous resists.

3.4

Test Procedure
Our approach to testing the coupled gratings system uses simulations related in

Chapter IV, where the gratings dimensions and relative position are optimized and
variations are introduced into one of the gratings.
The foundation of the coupled gratings testing requires correlation of the output
intensity from the simulation results, with the measured output intensity. A test setup has
been configured, where the fiber and glass substrate gratings are brought in contact using
a nanomanipulator. The input is introduced using a laser and the output is collected by a
photodetector. The assembly components will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter
VI. Additionally, the testing results of the coupled subwavelength gratings are presented.
The testing and simulation results will be compared, where the overall total system
assessment will be described in detail.
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CHAPTER IV: Simulation Results
The effects of beam size, number of lines, rotational misalignment on coupled
subwavelength gratings (CSWGs), and of variations in the second grating of the coupled
pair are investigated in this chapter using optical modeling. Although the effects of input
beam size and finite number of grating lines has been studied for subwavelength gratings
[281-285], to the best of our knowledge the influence on CSWGs has not been analyzed
yet. Therefore, using finite difference time domain (FDTD) simulations [255],
optimization of the gratings periods from both SW gratings, and observation of the effect
the beam diameter, the number of grating lines written on the optical fiber facet, and the
rotational misalignment between the gratings in the fiber facet and the SWGs in the glass
substrate are presented.
This chapter is organized as follows: The simulation parameters and optimum
coupling efficiency results are described for EW coupling. Secondly, the influence of the
width of the input light beam on the output far-field intensity pattern is depicted. Thirdly,
the effect of a finite number of grating lines in one of the gratings is discussed. Next,
misalignment effects are analyzed. Then, the impact of two examples of variations in the
glass grating is observed and discussed. Last, conclusions are stated.

4.1

Simulation Set-Up
A Gaussian wave of wavelength 0.65 µm, normally incident on the gratings, was

chosen as the illuminating light source, as opposed to a longer, non-visible infrared
wavelength to permit visual inspection. The light was TE-polarized (i.e. the electric field
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is parallel to the gratings). The first grating was patterned with a 50% duty cycle, i.e.
lines of equal width l1 were separated by a distance d1 = l1; the refractive index was equal
to the effective index of a silica fiber (n1 ≈ 1.456). The second SW grating was patterned
in a 4 µm thick borosilicate glass substrate (n2 ≈ 1.47) with 50% duty cycle. The
surrounding medium where the field was recovered was air (n0 = 1). The twodimensional simulation domain had dimensions 320 µm in the x (transverse) direction
and 8 µm in the z (propagation) direction, and the minimum mesh size used was 0.02 x
0.02 µm2. The far-field pattern is calculated from the near field, using a wide angle far
field transform based on the Fresnel-Kirchhoff diffraction formula [286]. The simulation
layout is illustrated in Figure 30.

Figure 30: Simulation setup
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a)

b)
Figure 31: a) Coupled 200 nm and 500 nm gratings, with 1 µm equivalent period. b) Diffraction orders
generated by coupled gratings when Λ1 = 200 nm and Λ2 is varied between 200 and 600 nm. In this case
only the 200 nm - 500 nm pair is not subwavelength and gives rise to a diffraction order at about 40.5o
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We performed the CSWGs concept using optical simulations. We observed higherorder diffraction peaks in the far field every time the combination of the two gratings
formed a structure with a non-subwavelength period equal to the least common multiple
of the periods of the gratings. For example, for a grating pair with periods 200 nm and
500 nm a diffraction order was observed at ~40.50o, as illustrated in Figure 31, consistent
with the diffraction angle for a period of Λ = 1000 nm or 1 µm given by equation (2).
Likewise, for a grating pair with periods 300 nm and 400 nm (combined period of 1200
nm or 1.2 µm), we had a diffraction order at 32.8o, and for periods of 300 nm and 500 nm
(combined period of 1500 nm or 1.5 µm) we had a first diffraction order at 25.6o and a
second diffraction order at 60.1o.

4.2

Optimization of Gratings Periods and Thicknesses
To obtain the maximum coupling output efficiency from the CSWG system,

optimization of the gratings dimensions needed to be performed. The initial grating
thickness for the CSWGs was 200 nm, from the result for optimal thickness of glass-toglass assemblies produced by Rogers, et. al [15]. There was no gap between the gratings.
Additionally, the half-width-half-maximum (HWHM) of the input electric field was
selected to be 50 µm (FWHM = 100 µm) to cover a large window in a simulation domain
of width 320 µm. In an effort to determine the optimal coupled SWG pair, the period of
the first grating (etched in the optical fiber) Λ1 and the period of the second SWG Λ2
were both individually varied from 200 nm to 640 nm (gratings still SW to the 650 nm
incident source) in 20 nm increments as illustrated in Figure 32.
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Figure 32: Far-field peak intensities for different combinations of periods in coupled gratings

Higher diffraction orders were observed in the far field every time the combination
of the two gratings formed a structure with a non-subwavelength period equal to the least
common multiple of the periods of the gratings. The output intensity was normalized to
be expressed in dB, as shown in equation (60), to account for the output of the simulated
data being expressed in arbitrary units (a.u.):

P 
10  log10  1st   PdB .
 P0th 

(60)

The maximum output intensity was obtained when the first grating period was 580
nm and the second grating period was 560 nm, forming an effective period of 16.24 µm.
However, to be able to better differentiate the first order from the other higher diffraction
orders, the pair Λ1 = 560 nm and Λ2 = 420 nm with a smaller effective period of 1.68
µm, illustrated in Figure 33, was selected. This SWG pair produces a diffraction order at
22.76˚, which is consistent with the diffraction angle for a period of Λ = 1.68 µm.
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Choosing CSWG periods of Λ1 = 560 nm and Λ2 = 420 nm, the next simulation was
performed to optimize the grating thicknesses and produce the maximum output intensity.
The thickness of each grating was varied from 100 nm to 600 nm in 100 nm increments.
The values of the relative maximum output intensity in dB of each peak are given in
Table 4. The highest maximum output intensity was found to be -11.42 dB for the fiber
gratings with thickness of 300 nm and a borosilicate glass grating thickness of 400 nm.
From these experiments, the optimum parameters for the gratings etched in the silica
fiber are a grating period of 560 nm and a grating thickness of 300 nm. The gratings
etched in the borosilicate glass substrate have a grating period of 420 nm and a grating
thickness of 400 nm. The next section will focus on the input beam diameter and its
effect on the maximum output intensity.

Figure 33: 1.68 µm equivalent grating period from a 560 nm and 420 nm grating pair
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Table 4: First order far-field output intensities of variable grating thicknesses for Λ1 = 560 nm – Λ2 = 420
nm SWG pair

Grating thickness etched in fiber facet

100 nm

4.3

Grating thickness etched in glass substrate
200 nm
300 nm
400 nm
500 nm

600 nm

100 nm

-26.95 dB

-24.74 dB

-25.35 dB

-22.80 dB

-27.00 dB

-29.87 dB

200 nm

-21.18 dB

-18.57 dB

-16.37 dB

-15.10 dB

-19.01 dB

-19.11 dB

300 nm

-17.75 dB

-13.98 dB

-12.31 dB

-11.42 dB

-14.46 dB

-16.19 dB

400 nm

-17.11 dB

-13.66 dB

-12.76 dB

-11.52 dB

-14.63 dB

-16.39 dB

500 nm

-21.11 dB

-18.04 dB

-15.95 dB

-15.78 dB

-17.78 dB

-19.51 dB

600 nm

-25.86 dB

-25.53 dB

-20.99 dB

-23.23 dB

-23.54 dB

-25.25 dB

Effect of Beam Width
After optimization of the gratings periods and thicknesses, the effect of the beam

width on the coupled gratings was investigated. We first determined the noise floor by
running simulations with one subwavelength grating, the borosilicate layer being
completely absent. Since a single SW grating allows transmission of only the zeroth
order, the lower level of the transmitted signal can be considered noise, and this level did
not change for CSWGs. Similarly to the transmitted electromagnetic wave intensity the
noise was expressed in dB following the formula:

P
10  log  noise   P .
dB
10  P

 0th 

(61)

A minimum HWHM of 4 µm (FWM = 8 µm), was necessary for a defined
separation between the diffraction and noise floor. For larger beam widths, the noise level
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stayed at a minimum below -160 dB for HWHM up to 30 µm (FWHM = 60 µm) as
visible in Figure 34. A close-up between HWHM 26 µm and 34 µm revealed that the
minimum was in fact 28 µm (FWHM = 56 µm). The level rose for HWHM larger than 28
µm, due to the stronger contribution of secondary maxima [287].

Figure 34: Effect of Beam Width on CSWGs with grating periods Λ1 = 560 nm and Λ2 = 420 nm with
HWHM varied from 10 µm to 100 µm in 10 µm increments and from 100 µm to 200 µm in 50 µm
increments, and on single subwavelength gratings (sw) with grating period Λ1 = 560 nm

From the result presented in this section, it can be concluded that 8 µm is the
minimum beam diameter that will allow distinguishing between two diffraction orders,
but with beams wider than 56 µm contrast will be diminished in the far-field pattern. In
the next section, the effects of having a finite number of grating lines will be presented.
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4.4

Effect of the Number of Grating Lines
The envisioned device has the first grating of the CSWG pair FIB-milled on the facet

of an optical fiber. As a result, there are a maximum number of grating lines that can be
patterned. The next simulations presents the effect the number of grating lines has on the
output of the CSWG pair when the first grating with period 560 nm and thickness 300 nm
has a finite number of lines and the second grating with period 420 nm and thickness 400
nm an “infinite” number of lines. Infinite denotes that the second grating was so much
larger than the first one and that any effect due to its size limitations became negligible.
Each line was represented by an integer number m, m = 0 being the center line, m = ±1
the first lines to the left and to the right of the center line, and so on, following the same
nomenclature as for diffraction orders. The total number of lines was thus N = 2m + 1.
The wavelength of the input source was 650 nm with a HWHM of 28 microns.
With a 0 nm gap between the gratings, the first order diffraction peak started to
emerge as dominant in the region for m = 7 (N = 15), as seen in Figure 35(a). In the
coupled gratings system this gives five effective periods. In practical applications, it is
not easy to bring the two gratings into contact without a gap between them, so the two
gratings were also placed in proximity with a gap of 300 nm between them. With the 300
nm separation, the first order peak was dominant for m = 11 (N = 23), with lower
maximum intensity, as shown in Figure 35(b). The noise level also decreased
significantly for large m to reach a bottom below -160 dB when approaching m ≈ 300 (N
≈ 601) where the number of lines can be considered infinite for practical purposes as seen
for the 0 nm gap in Figure 36.
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The minimum number of 15 grating lines on the fiber facet established, one more
consideration was the misalignments inherent to a multi-component assembly. They are
discussed in the next section.

a)

b)

Figure 35: Far-Field Diffraction Patterns: a) Far-field diffraction patterns for small numbers of grating lines
in the first grating of a coupled pair with no gap between them. b) Far-field diffraction patterns for small
numbers of grating lines in the first grating of a coupled pair with a 300 nm gap between them

Figure 36: Far-field diffraction patterns for large numbers of grating lines in the first grating of a coupled
pair with no gap between them
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4.5

Effect of Rotational Misalignment
In a physical environment, it can be a challenge to perfectly align the light source to

first grating #1 and grating #1 to grating #2. When the first grating is written directly on
the fiber facet, the fabrication process eliminates misalignment of the beam, since the
grating remains at a fixed position relative to the incident beam. However, the cylindrical
shape of the fiber might give rise to a slight rotation γ of the fiber grating with respect to
the second grating, as illustrated in Figure 37, where the cases of perfect alignment (0°
rotation) and 15° rotation of the fiber grating are shown. The dominant moiré fringes
created by the superposition of two gratings with close periods are visible in Figure
37(b).

Figure 37: Perfect rotational alignment between fiber and borosilicate glass gratings. (b) 15-degree rotation
of the fiber grating with respect to the borosilicate glass grating, giving rise to moiré fringes at an angle ζ

When the spacing between the moiré fringes is large, these fringes will constitute a
new effective non-subwavelength grating for the wavelength in use and will result is a
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different far-field diffraction pattern. The orientation of the fringes follows the
intersection points of the two gratings, and the diffraction orders must deviate from the
horizontal axis by this same angle. The fringe angle ζ and period Λf can be determined as
solved in [288]:

sin  

 sin 
2
2
2
    2    cos 
1
2
1 2

(62)

and
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1 2

.

(63)

In order to verify the effect of the fiber rotation i.e. of the moiré pattern on the output
of CSWGs, a 3D simulation environment was necessary to represent movement around
the propagation axis (z). To avoid reaching the memory limit of the computer system the
FDTD computation domain was limited to a rectangular parallelepiped L x W x H = 6
µm x 20 µm x 20 µm. The fiber designed with OptiFDTD emulated the last micron at the
output extremity of a silica fiber with core index nco = 1.45653 and cladding index ncl =
1.45187 at the wavelength λ0 = 650 nm, in which is propagating the LP01 mode or
fundamental (lowest order) mode of the fiber. The core diameter was 8.2 µm. The
cladding diameter would theoretically be 125 µm but since this dimension is much larger
than the domain considered in the simulation, the diameter was chosen such that it just
covered the domain. At the operating wavelength the LP modes are well confined in the
core and the smaller cladding did not change the fiber modes behavior. The fiber grating
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covered an area of 10 µm x 10 µm at the center of the fiber output facet. The fiber grating
period was 560 nm with a fill factor of 50% and an optimal thickness of 300 nm. The
grating on glass (ng = 1.47) covered the entire domain, with a period of 420 nm, a fill
factor of 50% and an optimal thickness of 400 nm. The periods of the gratings gave an
effective period of 1.68 µm. With 20 grating lines on the fiber 5 whole effective periods
were present for discernible first orders. The thickness of the glass substrate was 4 µm.
The resulting output in dB is shown in Figure 38 for perfectly aligned gratings (no
rotation), where the bright red represents 0 dB and is the greatest output intensity. The
first orders were centered at a diffraction angle θ ≈ 23°, matching the calculations for a
1.68 µm equivalent period.

Figure 38: Far-field output intensity map
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The calculation results for the fringe angles with respect to the vertical axis, the
simulated fringe angles given by the first orders position with respect to the horizontal
axis, the calculated fringe spacing and the diffraction angle θ of the first diffraction order
are given in Table 5, with the parameters mentioned above, for different angles γ between
the gratings. Table 5 suggests that for rotation angles of 40° and higher, the fringe pattern
becomes subwavelength for the operating wavelength and does not generate higher
orders in the far field, which was verified in the simulations. The simulated far-field
pattern displayed a rotation with respect to the horizontal axis that followed the
calculated fringe angles, with a small difference attributed to the precision of the
simulation cell size (in particular, faint first orders were still discernible for γ = 40° at
large diffraction angles).

Table 5: Fringe angle, period and diffraction angle for different fiber rotation angles
Rotation angle γ
(deg)

Calculated fringe
angle ζc (deg)

0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90

0
14.49
26.48
35.16
40.99
44.70
46.94
48.13
48.57
48.47
47.97
47.15
46.10
44.86
43.47
41.95
40.34
38.64
36.87

Simulated
fringe angle ζs
(deg)
0
~16
~29
~38
~42
~44
~46
~47
~47
-
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Calculated
fringe spacing
Λf (µm)
1.68
1.61
1.44
1.25
1.07
0.93
0.82
0.73
0.65
0.59
0.54
0.50
0.47
0.44
0.41
0.39
0.37
0.35
0.34

Calculated
diffraction angle θ
(deg)
22.76
23.84
26.87
31.44
37.25
44.22
52.60
63.39
-

The resulting far-field pattern with γ = 5° rotation, is shown in Figure 39 and can be
compared to the no-rotation case in Figure 38.

Figure 39: Far-field pattern with fringe angle 16o resulting from the presence of a 5° fiber rotation

4.6

Variations in Glass Grating
To create a unique signature, it was important to observe the effect small variations

in the second grating (etched in borosilicate glass) would have on the far-field pattern.
The objective was to detect and observe a diffraction pattern that would be different for
each grating pair. In the second grating, while each line remained centered at its original
location, maintaining the effective grating period, they had a random width taken within a
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uniform interval centered at the original line width. In Figure 40a, the line width was
varied between 147 nm and 273 nm, which represent a 30% variation on each side of the
center line width, 210 nm. In Figure 40b, where is shown the far-field patterns of a
regular and two varied CSWGs it can be seen how this line width deviation introduced
variations in the output of two instances of varied coupled gratings while the diffraction
peaks stayed visible and were still located at the same angles. The first order maximum
remained defined in both device samples and the signature unique to a specific sample.
The second maximum adjacent to the first order was a combined consequence of the
presence of the gap and the small beam width.
The concept of the CSWGs signature having been modeled with random variations,
one more consideration was the ease of fabricating and testing a specific instance of
varied gratings. In order to be able to compare simulations and tests results, two instances
were designed with a planned pattern so that the fabricated CSWGs would be the same as
the simulated ones.
The first CSWGs featured a series of larger lines of width 1.05 µm separated by a
periodic distance of 14.7 µm, slightly larger than the width covered by the fiber gratings.
It was hypothesized that starting with the fiber centered on one “defect” and moved in
steps to the next defect, the output intensity would be the same at those two end points
and there would be mirror symmetry of maximum intensity between positive and
negative first orders for every two positions equidistant from the center point between
two defects. The concept is illustrated in Figure 41(a) and the symmetric distribution of
maximum intensities in Figure 41(b) and Figure 41(c). The points are connected better
visibility.
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Varied grating

Regular grating

a)

b)
Figure 40: a) Line width variation in the second grating of a coupled pair, between 147 nm and 273 nm,
interval representing a 30% variation on each side of the center line width, 210 nm. b) Far-field pattern for
30% line width variation. The pattern for a regular grating is also given for reference
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b)
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c)
Figure 41: a) Mirror symmetry positions around periodic defects. b) and c) Symmetric distribution of maximum intensities
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a)

b)
Figure 42: a) Similar positions in periodically varied grating (period 13.86 µm). b) Maximum output
intensities are the same for a first diffraction order at two similar positions (0 µm and 13.86 µm)

84

In the second CSWGs, the line widths were varied in ascending order from 150 nm
to 210 nm to 270 nm over a period of 13.86 µm. In this case as well the maximum output
intensity would be the same for a first diffraction order at two similar positions (over a
length of 13.86 µm). This is illustrated in Figure 42.

4.7

Conclusion
The effect of beam size, finite number of lines, rotational misalignment and grating

variations on coupled subwavelength gratings was investigated in this chapter. After
establishing that the effective period given by the combination of the periods of the
grating pair must be non-subwavelength for transmission of higher diffraction orders to
take place, the characteristic parameters of regular infinite gratings, periods and
thickness, were optimized, for a wavelength of 650 nm. The best dimensions were found
to be a period of 560 nm for the first grating made of silica and 420 nm for the second
borosilicate glass grating. The size of the input light beam had to be a HWHM of at least
7 µm to allow discernible higher transmission orders, and a HWHM of 28 µm for
minimum noise. At least 15 lines needed to be present on the fiber facet. Grating rotation
due to milling the first grating in the CSWG pair directly on a fiber facet, resulted in a
rotation of the far-field pattern, corresponding to the rotation angle of moiré fringes.

85

CHAPTER V: Gratings Fabrication
Standard use of focused ion beam (FIB) and electron beam lithography (EBL) were
introduced in Chapter III. Here, we will describe how they were applied to the fabrication
of gratings on fiber facet and gratings on glass substrate. Both material being dielectric,
charging effect had to be addressed.

5.1

Gratings on Fiber Facet
A length of 25 mm was stripped out of a 60-cm long Thorlabs SMF-28 optical fiber,

cleaned with Acetone and Isopropyl Alcohol (IPA) and cleaved with an Ericsson EFC114 fiber cleaver to leave a flat facet at the end of bare fiber length of 1 mm, as can be
observed in Figure 43(a) obtained from the scanning electron microscope (SEM) imaging
system of the JEOL JIB-4500 focused ion beam (FIB) machine in the FIU Advanced
Materials Engineering Research Institute (AMERI). To avoid charging, the fiber tip was
sputtered with a 3-nm thick layer of gold, using a Pelco SC-7 auto sputter coater. The
pressure was brought down to 0.01 mbar, and sputtering lasted 50 seconds at 30 mA. In
order to have the fiber facet facing to ion beam column of the FIB machine, the bare tip
of the fiber was affixed using copper tape to the top of a custom-made mount angled at
52o to match the FIB column. The remaining of the fiber strand was folded around the
mount and secure with more copper tape. Multiple fibers can be arranged on a single
mount, as shown in Figure 43(b).
The gratings were milled by FIB at the center of the fiber facet with the following
parameters:
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Table 6: Parameters for FIB milling on fiber facets
Number of lines

Width of lines

Length of lines

Width of spaces

Beam current

Dose

30

280 nm

15 µm

280 nm

500 pA

1.5 nC/µm2

The top view and cross section of the resulting gratings on Fiber #1 are pictured in
Figure 44. The trapezoidal shape of the lines is attributed to a combination of
redeposition, ion beam profile and dependency of the sputter yield on incidence angle
[271, 289-292].

a)

b)
Figure 43: a) Stripped and cleaved fiber mounted in JEOL FIB machine. b) Fibers mounted in preparation
for FIB
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a)

b)
Figure 44: a) Top view of grating on facet of fiber #1. b) Cross-section of the grating

5.2

Gratings on Glass Substrate
The gratings were designed in Juspertor’s LayoutEditor. Four identical rows, made

of regular subwavelength gratings along with what would be their non-subwavelength
equivalent when coupled with a grating of period 560 nm and the three simulated varied
gratings, were drawn to fit inside a 4-inch wafer. Each grating covered an area of 500 µm
x 500 µm. The complete layout, with dimensions, is depicted in Figure 45(a) and a closeup on one varied grating is shown in Figure 45(b).
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a)

b)
Figure 45: a) Gratings design in LayoutEditor. b) Varied grating design

The gratings were subsequently patterned using a JEOL JBX-6300FS electron beam
lithography (EBL) system. A glass substrate was spin coated with ZEP-520. After the
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ZEP520 was spun on the glass substrate, a thin layer of ESPACER was spun on the
ZEP520 to dissipate the charge buildup during EBL as shown in Figure 46.

Figure 46: EBL process flow on a glass substrate with an ESPACER charge dissipation agent and ZEP
photo resist

The sample was then exposed with the EBL grating pattern and rinsed in de-ionized
water to remove the ESPACER, and blown dry with nitrogen. The sample was developed
in amyl acetate to completely remove the ZEP520 that was exposed during the e-beam
patterning. The ZEP520 resist was used as a mask layer to etch the gratings 400 nm deep
into the glass substrate using a STS glass etcher. The wafers were cleaned in acetone and
methanol.
To avoid charging effect during scanning electron microscope (SEM) imaging, the
first row of the sample was sputtered with a gold-palladium alloy. The deposition time
was 40s, which led to a thickness of 12 to16 nm. The resulting SEM images for a nonsubwavelength grating of period 1.68 µm, a regular subwavelength of period 0.42 µm
and the varied subwavelength grating in Figure 42(a) and Figure 45(b) are shown in
Figure 47. Here again, in the cross sections in Figure 47(b) and (d) the gratings show a
trapezoidal profile, result of process fabrication steps, i.e., e-beam lithography and RIE
etching.
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a)

b)
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c)

224 nm
418 nm

382 nm

188 nm

d)
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e)
Figure 47: SEM pictures of gratings fabricated on glass substrate. a) Top view of regular nonsubwavelength grating. b) Cross section of regular non-subwavelength grating. c) Top view of regular
subwavelength grating. d) Cross section of regular subwavelength grating. e) Top view of varied
subwavelength grating
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CHAPTER VI: Tests, Results and Discussion
Testing and verification of the tamper-evident system was first confirmed from the
simulation results in Chapter IV. In this section, an explanation of the test setup used and
a comparison of the output intensity from the simulation results and the measured output
intensity from the evanescent wave coupling of the SWG and the grating fiber are
presented. The SWG etched into the facet of the optical fiber was brought into contact,
which represents a 0 µm gap separation, with the SWG on the glass substrate. This
resulted in far-field diffraction being observed. As the grating samples lost contact and
began to separate, the far-field diffraction pattern became dimmer and eventually
disappeared. The overall total system assessment is described in detail, and future work
including unique identification is introduced.
6.1 Test Set-Up
The final test set-up is depicted in Figure 48.

Figure 48: Complete test set-up for evanescent coupling
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6.1.1 Light Sources
In the test setup, two light sources were used. The first one was used for rotational
alignment of the beam and the other was used as the incident source for the SWG and
fiber grating pair.
The first source was a 5 mW green (λ = 532 nm) laser that was coupled to the optical
fiber via a Thorlabs ST1XY-S XY translation mount mounted vertically on a post. The
translation mount allows the user to adjust the beam position, further centering the beam
in the fiber core. The laser was secured in horizontal position by a lens holder and a
retaining ring inside the holder, as illustrated in Figure 49.

Figure 49: Green laser source

The second light source that was previously shown in the final set-up in Figure 48
was a 10 mW red (λ = 650 nm) Thorlabs L650P007 diode laser driven by a LDC201CU
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current controller, and coupled to the optical fiber via focusing lenses and a Thorlabs
ST1XY-S XY translation mount mounted vertically on a post. The fiber input was affixed
to the translation mount via a FC-PC fiber connector that was connected to a fiber adapter
with external plate screwed into the translation mount.

These different lens and

translations mounts are used for maximizing the amount of light that is transmitted
through the optical fiber.

6.1.2 Fiber and glass substrate mounting
The gratings that were etched into the optical fiber were written using the focused
ion beam (FIB). The grating dimension on the fiber had a 15 µm field size with a grating
of period 560 nm and 30 individual lines. The fiber was then secured using a strong tape
and placed in a groove milled in an Aluminum chuck. The chuck was attached to the
Thorlabs Max302 flexure translation stage . The fiber was extended beyond the stage to
ensure that it touched the SWG sample in the glass substrate. As previously mentioned,
the green light source was used to determine the beam alignment, it was also used to
ensure that the diffraction orientation followed the same convention as the those in the
simulations. The glass substrate was fixed using a Thorlabs FH2 filter holder attached on
top of a 2-inch pole. Using a Thorlabs RA180 90o clamp, the 2-inch pole was mounted
perpendicularly on a 6-inch horizontal post attached in turn via a Thorlabs RA90 90o
adapter to a third, vertical post. This arrangement avoided having a vertical post base
between the flexure stage holding the fiber and the photodetector, allowing close
positioning of fiber, glass substrate and photodetector. The fiber longitudinal axis was
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perpendicular to the plane of the filter holder. The grating lines on the glass substrate
were vertical, allowing diffraction along a horizontal line.
6.1.3 Readout
The output light was recorded using a Thorlabs SC130C photodiode power sensor.
The photodiode was attached on a Newport 562 series x-y-z stage that allowed for
accurate movements to center the output onto the photodiode.

Additionally, the

photodiode was connected to the Thorlabs PM100USB power and energy meter that
communicated via USB for real-time data acquisition.
To verify the accuracy of the photodetector output, the laser was focused directly
into the photodetector. A constant power input was set to 10 mW and the photodetector
output showed an output value of 18 V. Additionally, when the laser is normally incident
upon the glass, without gratings, the transmitted output power was measured to be 15.86
V. This decrease in output intensity is a within 5% of the expected value due to Fresnel
reflections at the air:glass and glass:air interfaces (4%).

6.2

Testing

6.2.1 Gratings alignment
The first step in preliminary testing with the fiber grating was to ensure that the
grating lines on its facet were parallel to the lines of the glass grating and that the fiber
diffraction orders were within the transverse horizontal (x) distance covered by the x-y-z
stage supporting the photodetector. For that purpose the green laser pointer was used at
the input of the optical fiber, and a white round checkered screen of 1 inch diameter (to
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match the external threader centered on the photodetector) was placed in front of the
photodetector, facing the fiber output. A dot at the center of the circle marked the
location of the photodetector (Figure 50). Using the 532 nm laser, the grating period on
the fiber is non-subwavelength to this source. Therefore, higher diffraction orders were
visible on the projection screen (Figure 51). The fiber was rotated until all orders 0 and
+/-1 fell on a horizontal line. The distance between fiber and screen was adjusted until
with the fiber fixed, the photodetector was able to travel completely from left to right
without the first higher orders leaving the checkered screen. The x-knob marking at
which the photodetector was directly in front on the fiber (detecting the 0th order at its
maximum) was noted. The vertical (z-) position of the photodetector was also adjusted
for maximum output. A mirror was then placed in placed of the screen to verify
perpendicularity of the fiber with respect to the photodetector plane. Finally, a vertical
200-micron slit was placed in front of the photodetector to ensure isolation of the
different diffractions orders. The actual test set up is pictured in Figure 52.

Figure 50: Checkered screen for fiber alignment with photodetector
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With the gratings aligned, the grated fiber facet was positioned to touch the glass
grating by movements of the flexure stage (Figure 53). This was visually observed using
the Caltex long-range microscope with a Lumenera camera that could record video and
images to a computer.

Figure 51: With the 532 nm laser, the grating period on the fiber is non-subwavelength to the source.
Therefore, higher diffraction orders were visible on the projection screen

Figure 52: Actual test set up
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Figure 53: Fiber tip touching grating on glass. The fiber forms a straight line with its mirror reflection,
suggesting perpendicularity with glass surface

6.2.2 Tests with large gratings

a)

b)

Figure 54: Diffraction pattern of non-subwavelength grating; a) on opaque screen and b) as recorded by
power meter

A non-subwavelength grating of period 1680 nm is the equivalent of two
subwavelength gratings of periods respectively 560 nm and 420 nm. Such a grating was
used to ascertain the positions at which the first order diffractions would be captured by
the photodetector, since the diffraction angles for this equivalent grating would be the
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same as for the CSWGs. The red light source (λ = 650 nm) Thorlabs L650P007 was used.
The photodetector was placed at a distance of 10 mm from the glass grating, and moved
along the x axis so as to scan the diffraction pattern. The peaks of the +1 and -1 orders,
seen on Figure 54, were at the 4 mm and -4 mm positions respectively, consistent with a
diffraction angle of 22.76o. The same was repeated with a non-subwavelength grating of
period 3360 nm, equivalent to subwavelength gratings of periods 560 nm and 480 nm
respectively.

6.2.3 Evanescent coupling
The evanescent wave coupling was observed by placing the SWG on the fiber into
contact with the SWG in the glass substrate. While scanning the output intensity of the
CSWG pair with the photodector, the diffraction pattern was visible on the opaque
screen, as seen in Figure 55 for a 560 m – 480 nm pair of SW gratings, and consistent
with simulations, as illustrated in Figure 56.

Figure 55: Observed pattern resulting from evanescent coupling
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Figure 56: Scanning results for a 560 nm – 480 nm SWG pair recorded by power meter, overlaying
corresponding simulation results

However, there were instances where measurements were not observed. This is a
result of the normal incidence. To measure the higher diffraction orders at their maximum
intensity, the incident angle of the higher diffraction orders needed to be normally
incident on the active area of the photodetector. As a result, an 180o protractor was
placed on the table, its origin at the level of the point of incidence, as illustrated in Figure
57. The photodetector was placed on the protractor arc at the angles corresponding to
diffraction orders 0, -1 and +1, successively. The slit was removed from the
photodetector, as the distance between CSWGs and photodetector allowed complete
separation of each order. Additionally, it was ensured that the spot size of the diffraction
orders was smaller than the active area of the photodetector. Tests were conducted with
glass gratings of period 420 nm, and 480 nm for comparison. Two grating samples were
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used for each period. Although the absolute output values varied due to changes in fiber
length and bending, and quality of the coupling between the subwavelength gratings (gap
separation and angle between coupled gratings), the relative values of the ±1st orders
remained within a standard deviation of less than 2 dB, as can be seen in Table 7 and
Table 8.

Figure 57: The photodetector is placed at a diffraction angle to capture the higher order at its maximum
intensity

Table 7: Output intensity in diffraction orders captured by photodetector with 560 nm – 420 nm grating pair

Unit
Sample 1, test 1
Sample 1, test 2
Sample 1, test 3
Sample 2, test 1
Sample 2, test 2
Standard deviation

0th order
W
dB
0.135E-6
1
0.124E-6
1
0.124E-6
1
0.126E-6
1
1.100E-6
1

-1st order
W
1.600E-9
0.900E-9
0.700E-9
0.850E-9
17.00E-9
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dB
-19.26
-21.39
-22.48
-21.71
-18.11
1.83

+1st order
W
3.000E-9
1.300E-9
1.900E-9
1.200E-9
10.00E-9

dB
-16.53
-19.79
-18.15
-20.21
-20.41
1.65

Table 8: Output intensity in diffraction orders captured by photodetector with 560 nm – 480 nm grating pair
0th order
W
dB
1.000E-6
1
0.890E-6
1
0.400E-6
1
0.600E-6
1
0.559E-6
1

Unit
Sample 1, test 1
Sample 1, test 2
Sample 1, test 3
Sample 2, test 1
Sample 2, test 2
Standard deviation

6.3

-1st order
W
12.00E-9
17.00E-9
8.00E-9
7.80E-9
4.20E-9

+1st order
dB
-19.21
-17.19
-16.99
-18.86
-21.24
1.73

W
13.3E-9
28.0E-9
11.6E-9
7.60E-9
11.8E-9

dB
-18.76
-15.02
-15.38
-18.97
-16.76
1.84

Modeling and Measurements Comparison

a)

b)

Figure 58: Simulation schematic of the coupled SW gratings. a) Original simulation layout. b) Resimulation layout from SEM analysis

Far field diffraction was observed from evanescent wave coupling of two
subwavelength gratings with different grating periods, fabricated on a fiber facet and in a
glass substrate. The grating dimensions were optimized to achieve maximum output in
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the +1 and -1 diffraction orders. From SEM analysis and as mentioned in Chapter V, the
shapes and dimensions of the fabricated gratings had changed from the profile of the
simulated gratings. New simulations were therefore conducted to match the
characteristics obtained from the SEM inspection, as shown in Figure 58.
The simulations indicated that there was a change in output intensity from the
original grating design to the re-simulated grating as seen in Figure 59. There is a
decrease from two- to three-dimensional simulations as well, which highlights further the
effect of finite dimensions (in this case, finite length of the grating lines) on performance.

Figure 59: Simulation output intensity results for 2D and 3D original simulation layout and re-simulation
layout from SEM analysis
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a)

b)
Figure 60: Simulation and experimental results for re-simulated CSWGs with different gap separations a)
560 nm – 420 nm pair b) 560 nm – 480 nm pair
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A few nanometers separation is often present between coupled gratings even in the
best alignment situation. Therefore data points from Table 7 and Table 8 are plotted in
Figure 60 along with re-simulation results showing the dependence of the output intensity
on grating separation. The experimental results remained, with acceptable error, close to
the re-simulated 3D coupled gratings within a separation between gratings of 200 nm.
The higher value of -16dB obtained for the +1st order of the 560 nm – 420 nm grating
pair is attributed to rougher alignment at the beginning of the experiment.

6.4

Conclusions and Future Work
Near-field evanescent wave coupling between a SWG on the core of an optical fiber

facet and a SWG etched into a glass substrate was demonstrated for the first time in this
dissertation, using a 0.65 μm red semiconductor laser. The optimal parameters were
determined and the limitations imposed by the fiber geometry established. Effects of
variations introduced in the glass grating were also explored. It was successfully verified
that the recorded output adequately matched simulated results.
Two different grating fabrication methods were employed during this work.
Subwavelength gratings with 560 nm period were successfully demonstrated using
focused ion beam milling on a fiber facet and subwavelength gratings with different
periods were fabricated using electron beam lithography.
The effect of variations in the grating line width were studied for the creation of a
signature, and the next step is to test prototypes of varied CSWGs and verify the
repeatability of the signature of a given “fingerprinted” grating when integrity of the
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protected device is assumed. A corresponding test setup will be used to demonstrate the
concept and the results will be compared to those obtained from the simulations.
The technology of CSWGs with optical fiber for tamper evidence application
demonstrated in this dissertation will not only allow to overcome challenges in the testing
of devices that are complete with packaging, but it will also assist in increasing
production yield by ensuring chip integrity.

108

References
[1]

M. Ortsiefer, et al., "Polarization control in buried tunnel junction VCSELs using
a birefringent semiconductor/dielectric subwavelength grating," Photonics
Technology Letters, IEEE, vol. 22, pp. 15-17, 2010.

[2]

M. Beresna and P. G. Kazansky, "Polarization diffraction grating produced by
femtosecond laser nanostructuring in glass," Optics letters, vol. 35, pp. 16621664, 2010.

[3]

M. C. Huang, et al., "A surface-emitting laser incorporating a high-index-contrast
subwavelength grating," Nature Photonics, vol. 1, pp. 119-122, 2007.

[4]

D. Fattal, et al., "Flat dielectric grating reflectors with focusing abilities," Nature
Photonics, vol. 4, pp. 466-470, 2010.

[5]

V. Karagodsky, et al., "Theoretical analysis of subwavelength high contrast
grating reflectors," Optics Express, vol. 18, pp. 16973-16988, 2010.

[6]

Y.-F. Huang, et al., "Improved broadband and quasi-omnidirectional antireflection properties with biomimetic silicon nanostructures," Nature
nanotechnology, vol. 2, pp. 770-774, 2007.

[7]

J. Chen and K. Sun, "Enhancement of the light conversion efficiency of silicon
solar cells by using nanoimprint anti-reflection layer," Solar Energy Materials
and Solar Cells, vol. 94, pp. 629-633, 2010.

[8]

J. Vörös, et al., "Optical grating coupler biosensors," Biomaterials, vol. 23, pp.
3699-3710, 2002.

[9]

R. Quidant, et al., "Near-field observation of evanescent light wave coupling in
subwavelength optical waveguides," EPL (Europhysics Letters), vol. 57, p. 191,
2002.

[10]

P. Cheben, et al., "Subwavelength waveguide grating for mode conversion and
light coupling in integrated optics," Optics Express, vol. 14, pp. 4695-4702, 2006.

[11]

G. C. Cho, et al., "Apertureless terahertz near-field microscopy," Semiconductor
science and technology, vol. 20, p. S286, 2005.

[12]

K. Taniguchi and Y. Kanemitsu, "Development of an apertureless near-field
optical microscope for nanoscale optical imaging at low temperatures," Japanese
journal of applied physics, vol. 44, p. 575, 2005.

109

[13]

D. W. Carr, et al., "Laterally deformable nanomechanical zeroth-order gratings:
anomalous diffraction studied by rigorous coupled-wave analysis," Optics letters,
vol. 28, pp. 1636-1638, 2003.

[14]

A.-A. A. Rogers, et al., "Far-field evanescent wave propagation using coupled
subwavelength gratings for a MEMS sensor," JOSA A, vol. 26, pp. 2526-2531,
2009.

[15]

A.-A. Rogers, "Evanescent wave coupling using subwavelength gratings for
optical MEMS accelerometer," Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, Electrical
Engineering, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, 2011.

[16]

R. Pappu, et al., "Physical one-way functions," Science, vol. 297, pp. 2026-2030,
2002.

[17]

J. Dou, et al., "Laser machining of micro-lenses on the end face of single-mode
optical fibers," Applied Physics A, vol. 91, pp. 591-594, 2008.

[18]

J. A. Hayward and J. Meraglia, "DNA to Safeguard Electrical Components and
Protect Against Counterfeiting and Diversion," in ISTFA 2011: Conference
Proceedings from the 37th International Symposium for Testing and Failure
Analysis, November 13017, 2011, San Jose Convention Center, San Jose,
California, USA., 2011, pp. 238-241.

[19]

J. C. Maxwell and J. J. Thompson, A treatise on electricity and magnetism vol. 2:
Clarendon, 1904.

[20]

M. Born and E. Wolf, Principles of optics: electromagnetic theory of
propagation, interference and diffraction of light: CUP Archive, 1999.

[21]

S. O. Kasap, Optoelectronics and Photonics: Principles and Practices, 1 ed.:
Prentice Hall, 2001.

[22]

C. Pollock and M. Lipson, Integrated photonics: Springer, 2003.

[23]

J.-M. Liu, Photonic devices vol. 58: Cambridge University Press Cambridge,
2005.

[24]

O. E. Dictionary, ""tamper, v.1" II.5," in Oxford English Dictionary, ed: Oxford
University Press, 2015.

[25]

O. E. Dictionary, ""counterfeit, v." 1.b.," in Oxford English Dictionary, ed:
Oxford University Press, 2015.

[26]

A.-M. F. Belva Martin, John Neumann, Lisa Gardner, Kevin Heinz, Robert
Bullock, MacKenzie Cooper, Jonathan Mulcare, Josie Sigl, Sylvia Schatz, and

110

Jean McSween, "Mitigating the Risk of Counterfeit Parts," Journal of the IEST,
vol. 53, pp. 5-17, 2010.
[27]

T. Yancey. (2013) Semiconductor R&D Spending Rises 7% Despite Weak
Market. Research Bulletin.

[28]

R. Lineback, "Semiconductor R&D Spending to Hit Record-High $53.4 Billion in
2012," IC InsightsSeptember 4, 2012 2012.

[29]

Frontier, "Estimating the global economic and social impacts of counterfeiting
and piracy," Report Commissioned by Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and
Piracy (BASCAP)2011.

[30]

Committee_on_Armed_Services, "Inquiry into Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the
Department of Defense Supply Chain," United States Senate, Washington,
DC2012.

[31]

P. J. Springer, Military robots and drones: ABC-CLIO, 2013.

[32]

IHS, "Reports of Counterfeit Parts Quadruple Since 2009, Challenging US
Defense Industry and National Security," ed. El Segundo, CA: IHS iSuppli, 2012.

[33]

R. Anderson and M. Kuhn, "Tamper resistance-a cautionary note," in Proceedings
of the second Usenix workshop on electronic commerce, 1996, pp. 1-11.

[34]

S. P. Skorobogatov, "Semi-invasive attacks-a new approach to hardware security
analysis," Technical report, University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory,
2005.

[35]

S. Skorobogatov, "Physical Attacks and Tamper Resistance," in Introduction to
Hardware Security and Trust, ed: Springer, 2012, pp. 143-173.

[36]

F. Koushanfar, et al., "Can EDA combat the rise of electronic counterfeiting?," in
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference, 2012, pp. 133138.

[37]

M. Rostami, et al., "Hardware security: Threat models and metrics," in
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, 2013,
pp. 819-823.

[38]

M. Rostami, et al., "A Primer on Hardware Security: Models, Methods, and
Metrics," Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 102, pp. 1283-1295, 2014.

[39]

U. Guin, et al., "Anti-Counterfeit techniques: from design to resign,"
Microprocessor test and verification (MTV), 2013.

111

[40]

U. Guin, et al., "Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global
Semiconductor Supply Chain," Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 102, pp. 1207-1228,
2014.

[41]

S. P. Skorobogatov and R. J. Anderson, "Optical fault induction attacks," in
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2002, ed: Springer,
2003, pp. 2-12.

[42]

Y. L. Tsang, "Identification of Extension Implant Defect in Sub-Micron CMOS
ICs-Analysis Technique, Model, and Solution," in ISTFA 2011: Conference
Proceedings from the 37th International Symposium for Testing and Failure
Analysis, November 13-17, 2011, San Jose Convention Center, San Jose,
California, USA, 2011, pp. 212-217.

[43]

R. Anderson and M. Kuhn, "Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices," in
Security Protocols, 1998, pp. 125-136.

[44]

F.-X. Standaert, "Introduction to side-channel attacks," in Secure Integrated
Circuits and Systems, ed: Springer, 2010, pp. 27-42.

[45]

P. C. Kocher, "Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS,
and other systems," in Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’96, 1996, pp. 104-113.

[46]

J.-F. Dhem, et al., "A practical implementation of the timing attack," in Smart
Card Research and Applications, 2000, pp. 167-182.

[47]

P. Kocher, et al., "Differential power analysis," in Advances in Cryptology—
CRYPTO’99, 1999, pp. 388-397.

[48]

S. Mangard, et al., Power analysis attacks: Revealing the secrets of smart cards
vol. 31: Springer, 2007.

[49]

K. Gandolfi, et al., "Electromagnetic analysis: Concrete results," in
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems—CHES 2001, 2001, pp. 251261.

[50]

J.-J. Quisquater and D. Samyde, "Electromagnetic analysis (ema): Measures and
counter-measures for smart cards," in Smart Card Programming and Security, ed:
Springer, 2001, pp. 200-210.

[51]

L. C. Wagner, Failure analysis of integrated circuits: tools and techniques:
Springer, 1999.

[52]

J. M. Soden, et al., "IC failure analysis: Magic, mystery, and science," Design &
Test of Computers, IEEE, vol. 14, pp. 59-69, 1997.

112

[53]

J. C. Tsang, et al., "Picosecond imaging circuit analysis," IBM Journal of
Research and Development, vol. 44, pp. 583-603, 2000.

[54]

B. Richards and P. Footner, The Role of microscopy in semiconductor failure
analysis: Oxford University Press, 1992.

[55]

C. Ajluni, "2 NEW IMAGING TECHNIQUES PROMISE TO IMPROVE IC
DEFECT IDENTIFICATION," Electronic Design, vol. 43, pp. 37-38, 1995.

[56]

C. H. Kim and J.-J. Quisquater, "Faults, injection methods, and fault attacks,"
Design & Test of Computers, IEEE, vol. 24, pp. 544-545, 2007.

[57]

D. Boneh, et al., "On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for
faults," in Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT’97, 1997, pp. 37-51.

[58]

M. S. Anderson, et al., "Towards Countering the Rise of the Silicon Trojan,"
DEFENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Edinburgh (Australia)2008.

[59]

J.-M. Schmidt, et al., "Optical fault attacks on AES: A threat in violet," in Fault
Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC), 2009 Workshop on, 2009, pp.
13-22.

[60]

J. G. van Woudenberg, et al., "Practical optical fault injection on secure
microcontrollers," in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC),
2011 Workshop on, 2011, pp. 91-99.

[61]

A. Dehbaoui, et al., "Electromagnetic transient faults injection on a hardware and
a software implementations of aes," in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in
Cryptography (FDTC), 2012 Workshop on, 2012, pp. 7-15.

[62]

J. Balasch, et al., "An In-depth and Black-box Characterization of the Effects of
Clock Glitches on 8-bit MCUs," in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in
Cryptography (FDTC), 2011 Workshop on, 2011, pp. 105-114.

[63]

H. Bar-El, et al., "The sorcerer's apprentice guide to fault attacks," Proceedings of
the IEEE, vol. 94, pp. 370-382, 2006.

[64]

S. Endo, et al., "An on-chip glitchy-clock generator for testing fault injection
attacks," Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, vol. 1, pp. 265-270, 2011.

[65]

M. Abramovici and P. Bradley, "Integrated circuit security: new threats and
solutions," in Proceedings of the 5th Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and
Information Intelligence Research: Cyber Security and Information Intelligence
Challenges and Strategies, 2009, p. 55.

[66]

S. Adee, "The hunt for the kill switch," Spectrum, IEEE, vol. 45, pp. 34-39, 2008.

113

[67]

D. Agrawal, et al., "Trojan detection using IC fingerprinting," in Security and
Privacy, 2007. SP'07. IEEE Symposium on, 2007, pp. 296-310.

[68]

S. Bhunia, et al., "Protection Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Towards a
Comprehensive Solution," IEEE Design & Test, vol. 30, pp. 6-17, 2013.

[69]

S. Bhunia, et al., "Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and
Countermeasures," Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 102, pp. 1229-1247, 2014.

[70]

R. S. Chakraborty, et al., "Hardware Trojan: Threats and emerging solutions," in
High Level Design Validation and Test Workshop, 2009. HLDVT 2009. IEEE
International, 2009, pp. 166-171.

[71]

R. Karri, et al., "Trustworthy hardware: Identifying and classifying hardware
trojans," Computer, pp. 39-46, 2010.

[72]

S. Skorobogatov and C. Woods, "Breakthrough Silicon Scanning Discovers
Backdoor in Military Chip," Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems–
CHES 2012, pp. 23-40, 2012.

[73]

M. Tehranipoor and F. Koushanfar, "A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy
and Detection," Design & Test of Computers, IEEE, vol. 27, pp. 10-25, 2010.

[74]

D. G. Abraham, et al., "Transaction security system," IBM Systems Journal, vol.
30, pp. 206-229, 1991.

[75]

NIST, "FIPS 140-2: Security requirements for cryptographic modules," in
Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, ed, 2001.

[76]

R. H. Walden, "Dynamic circuit disguise for microelectronic integrated digital
logic circuits," 5,202,591, 1993.

[77]

R. H. Walden, "Method for disguising a microelectronic integrated digital logic,"
5,336,624, 1994.

[78]

J. C. Ciccone and B. L. Yup, "Standard cell power-on-reset circuit," US 6,173,436
B1, 2001.

[79]

B. Vajana and M. Patelmo, "Mask programmed ROM inviolable by reverse
engineering inspections and method of fabrication," US 6,614,080 B2, 2003.

[80]

B. Vajana and M. Patelmo, "Anti-deciphering contacts," US 6,528,885 B2, 2003.

[81]

J. P. Baukus, et al., "Digital circuit with transistor geometry and channel stops
providing camouflage against reverse engineering," US6064110 A, 2000.

114

[82]

L.-W. Chow, et al., "Covert transformation of transistor properties as a circuit
protection method," US 7,541,266 B2, 2009.

[83]

W. M. Clark Jr, et al., "Programmable connection and isolation of active regions
in an integrated circuit using ambiguous features to confuse a reverse engineer,"
US 8,168,487 B2, 2012.

[84]

J. P. Baukus, et al., "Camouflaged circuit structure with step implants,"
5,973,375, 1999.

[85]

J. P. Baukus, et al., "Secure integrated circuit," US 6,294,816 B1, 2001.

[86]

J. P. Baukus, et al., "Programmable connector/isolator and double polysilicon
layer CMOS process with buried contact using the same," US 6,893,916 B2,
2005.

[87]

W. M. Clark Jr, et al., "Implanted hidden interconnections in a semiconductor
device for preventing reverse engineering," US 7,166,515 B2, 2007.

[88]

J. P. Baukus, et al., "Camouflaging a standard cell based integrated circuit,"
US8151235 B2, 2012.

[89]

L.-W. Chow, et al., "Integrated circuits protected against reverse engineering and
method for fabricating the same using vias without metal terminations," US
6,791,191 B2, 2004.

[90]

L.-W. Chow, et al., "Integrated circuits protected against reverse engineering and
method for fabricating the same using an apparent metal contact line terminating
on field oxide," US 7,294,935 B2, 2007.

[91]

L.-W. Chow, et al., "Use of silicon block process step to camouflage a false
transistor," US 7,344,932 B2, 2008.

[92]

L.-W. Chow, et al., "Symmetric non-intrusive and covert technique to render a
transistor permanently non-operable," US 8,049,281 B1, 2011.

[93]

L.-w. Chow, et al., "Conductive channel pseudo block process and circuit to
inhibit reverse engineering," US Patent 8,258,583, 2012.

[94]

R. P. Cocchi, et al., "Method and apparatus for camouflaging a standard cell
based integrated circuit with micro circuits and post processing," US8510700 B2,
2013.

[95]

L. L. Hsu, et al., "Techniques for Impeding Reverse Engineering," US Patent
20,130,052,822, 2013.

115

[96]

J. Rajendran, et al., "Security analysis of integrated circuit camouflaging," in
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &
communications security, 2013, pp. 709-720.

[97]

D. Page, "Defending against cache-based side-channel attacks," Information
Security Technical Report, vol. 8, pp. 30-44, 2003.

[98]

Y. Cohen and A. Aviv, "Anti-tampering enclosure for electronic circuitry," USA
Patent US6853093 B2, 2005.

[99]

J. A. Ambrose, et al., "Multiprocessor information concealment architecture to
prevent power analysis-based side channel attacks," IET computers & digital
techniques, vol. 5, pp. 1-15, 2011.

[100] M. Bucci, et al., "Delay-based dual-rail precharge logic," Very Large Scale
Integration (VLSI) Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 19, pp. 1147-1153, 2011.
[101] A.-T. Hoang and T. Fujino, "Intra-Masking Dual-Rail Memory on LUT
Implementation for SCA-Resistant AES on FPGA," ACM Transactions on
Reconfigurable Technology and Systems (TRETS), vol. 7, pp. 10:1-19, 2014.
[102] M. Morrison and N. Ranganathan, "Synthesis of Dual-Rail Adiabatic Logic for
Low Power Security Applications," Computer-Aided Design of Integrated
Circuits and Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 33, pp. 975-988, 2014.
[103] H. Saputra, et al., "Masking the energy behavior of DES encryption [smart
cards]," in Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition,
2003, 2003, pp. 84-89.
[104] K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, "A logic level design methodology for a secure DPA
resistant ASIC or FPGA implementation," in Proceedings of the conference on
Design, automation and test in Europe-Volume 1, 2004, pp. 246-251.
[105] G. B. Ratanpal, et al., "An on-chip signal suppression countermeasure to power
analysis attacks," Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol.
1, pp. 179-189, 2004.
[106] D. Agrawal, et al., "The EM side—channel (s)," in Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems-CHES 2002, ed: Springer, 2003, pp. 29-45.
[107] D. Karaklajic, et al., "Hardware Designer's Guide to Fault Attacks," Very Large
Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 21, pp. 2295-2306,
2013.
[108] H. Marzouqi, et al., "Review of gate-level differential power analysis and fault
analysis countermeasures," Information Security, IET, vol. 8, pp. 51-66, 2014.

116

[109] I. Verbauwhede, et al., "The fault attack jungle-a classification model to guide
you," in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC), 2011
Workshop on, 2011, pp. 3-8.
[110] S. Goldwasser, et al., "One-time programs," in Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO
2008, ed: Springer, 2008, pp. 39-56.
[111] Y. Huang, et al., "Faster Secure Two-Party Computation Using Garbled Circuits,"
in USENIX Security Symposium, 2011.
[112] Y. Huang, et al., "Private set intersection: Are garbled circuits better than custom
protocols?," in 19th Network and Distributed Security Symposium, San Diego,
2012.
[113] K. Järvinen, et al., "Garbled circuits for leakage-resilience: Hardware
implementation and evaluation of one-time programs," in Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2010, ed: Springer, 2010, pp. 383-397.
[114] A. C.-C. Yao, "How to generate and exchange secrets," in Foundations of
Computer Science, 1986., 27th Annual Symposium on, 1986, pp. 162-167.
[115] M. Bellare, et al., "Foundations of garbled circuits," in Proceedings of the 2012
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, 2012, pp. 784-796.
[116] J. Lach, et al., "Fingerprinting digital circuits on programmable hardware," in
Information Hiding, 1998, pp. 16-31.
[117] F. Koushanfar, et al., "Intellectual property metering," in Information Hiding,
2001, pp. 81-95.
[118] K. Lofstrom, et al., "IC identification circuit using device mismatch," in SolidState Circuits Conference, 2000. Digest of Technical Papers. ISSCC. 2000 IEEE
International, 2000, pp. 372-373.
[119] B. Gassend, et al., "Silicon physical random functions," in Proceedings of the 9th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, 2002, pp. 148-160.
[120] B. Gassend, et al., "Identification and authentication of integrated circuits,"
Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, vol. 16, pp. 1077-1098,
2004.
[121] J. W. Lee, et al., "A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for
identification and authentication applications," in VLSI Circuits, 2004. Digest of
Technical Papers. 2004 Symposium on, 2004, pp. 176-179.
[122] D. Lim, et al., "Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits," Very Large Scale
Integration (VLSI) Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 13, pp. 1200-1205, 2005.

117

[123] M. Majzoobi, et al., "Testing techniques for hardware security," in Test
Conference, 2008. ITC 2008. IEEE International, 2008, pp. 1-10.
[124] U. Rührmair, et al., "Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions," in
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, 2010, pp. 237-249.
[125] S. Katzenbeisser, et al., "PUFs: Myth, fact or busted? A security evaluation of
physically unclonable functions (PUFs) cast in silicon," in Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems–CHES 2012, ed: Springer, 2012, pp. 283-301.
[126] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas, "Physical unclonable functions for device
authentication and secret key generation," in Proceedings of the 44th annual
Design Automation Conference, 2007, pp. 9-14.
[127] H. Bin, et al., "A Multiple Bits Output Ring-Oscillator Physical Unclonable
Function," in Intelligent Signal Processing and Communications Systems
(ISPACS), 2011 International Symposium on, 2011, pp. 1-5.
[128] Q. Chen, et al., "The bistable ring puf: A new architecture for strong physical
unclonable functions," in Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2011
IEEE International Symposium on, 2011, pp. 134-141.
[129] R. Kumar, et al., "On Design of Temperature Invariant Physically Unclonable
Functions Based on Ring Oscillators," in VLSI (ISVLSI), 2012 IEEE Computer
Society Annual Symposium on, 2012, pp. 165-170.
[130] A. Maiti and P. Schaumont, "Improved ring oscillator PUF: an FPGA-friendly
secure primitive," Journal of cryptology, vol. 24, pp. 375-397, 2011.
[131] A. Maiti, et al., "A robust physical unclonable function with enhanced challengeresponse set," Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 7,
pp. 333-345, 2012.
[132] S. S. Mansouri and E. Dubrova, "Ring oscillator physical unclonable function
with multi level supply voltages," in Computer Design (ICCD), 2012 IEEE 30th
International Conference on, 2012, pp. 520-521.
[133] D. Merli, et al., "Improving the quality of ring oscillator PUFs on FPGAs," in
Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security, 2010.
[134] G. Qu and C.-E. Yin, "Temperature-aware cooperative ring oscillator PUF," in
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2009. HOST'09. IEEE International
Workshop on, 2009, pp. 36-42.

118

[135] V. Vivekraja and L. Nazhandali, "Feedback based supply voltage control for
temperature variation tolerant pufs," in VLSI Design (VLSI Design), 2011 24th
International Conference on, 2011, pp. 214-219.
[136] C.-E. Yin, "A Group-Based Ring Oscillator Physical Unclonable Function,"
Doctoral Dissertation, Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, College
Park, 2012.
[137] U. Guin, et al., "Low-cost On-Chip Structures for Combating Die and IC
Recycling," in Proceedings of the The 51st Annual Design Automation
Conference on Design Automation Conference, 2014, pp. 1-6.
[138] S. Tajik, et al., "Physical Characterization of Arbiter PUFs," in Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems–CHES 2014, ed: Springer, 2014, pp. 493-509.
[139] C. Boehm and M. Hofer, "Using srams as physical unclonable functions," in
Proceedings of the 17th Austrian Workshop on Microelectronics-Austrochip,
2009, pp. 117-122.
[140] C. Bohm, et al., "A microcontroller sram-puf," in Network and System Security
(NSS), 2011 5th International Conference on, 2011, pp. 269-273.
[141] M. Cortez, et al., "Modeling SRAM start-up behavior for Physical Unclonable
Functions," in Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems
(DFT), 2012 IEEE International Symposium on, 2012, pp. 1-6.
[142] J. Guajardo, et al., "FPGA intrinsic PUFs and their use for IP protection," in
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2007, ed: Springer,
2007, pp. 63-80.
[143] J. Guajardo, et al., "Brand and IP protection with physical unclonable functions,"
in Circuits and Systems, 2008. ISCAS 2008. IEEE International Symposium on,
2008, pp. 3186-3189.
[144] D. E. Holcomb, et al., "Initial SRAM state as a fingerprint and source of true
random numbers for RFID tags," in Proceedings of the Conference on RFID
Security, 2007.
[145] D. E. Holcomb, et al., "Power-up SRAM state as an identifying fingerprint and
source of true random numbers," Computers, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 58, pp.
1198-1210, 2009.
[146] J. Kim, et al., "Toward reliable SRAM-based device identification," in Computer
Design (ICCD), 2010 IEEE International Conference on, 2010, pp. 313-320.

119

[147] J. Kim, et al., "System accuracy estimation of SRAM-based device
authentication," in Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), 2011 16th Asia
and South Pacific, 2011, pp. 37-42.
[148] P. Koeberl, et al., "A practical device authentication scheme using SRAM PUFs,"
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, vol. 2, pp. 255-269, 2012.
[149] R. Maes, et al., "Low-overhead implementation of a soft decision helper data
algorithm for SRAM PUFs," in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems-CHES 2009, ed: Springer, 2009, pp. 332-347.
[150] N. Saxena and J. Voris, "Data remanence effects on memory-based entropy
collection for RFID systems," International Journal of Information Security, vol.
10, pp. 213-222, 2011.
[151] G.-J. Schrijen and V. van der Leest, "Comparative analysis of SRAM memories
used as PUF primitives," in Proceedings of the Conference on Design,
Automation and Test in Europe, 2012, pp. 1319-1324.
[152] G. Selimis, et al., "Evaluation of 90nm 6T-SRAM as Physical Unclonable
Function for secure key generation in wireless sensor nodes," in Circuits and
Systems (ISCAS), 2011 IEEE International Symposium on, 2011, pp. 567-570.
[153] V. van der Leest, et al., "Efficient implementation of true random number
generator based on sram pufs," in Cryptography and Security: From Theory to
Applications, ed: Springer, 2012, pp. 300-318.
[154] S. S. Kumar, et al., "The butterfly PUF protecting IP on every FPGA," in
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008. HOST 2008. IEEE International
Workshop on, 2008, pp. 67-70.
[155] C. Helfmeier, et al., "Cloning physically unclonable functions," in HardwareOriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on,
2013, pp. 1-6.
[156] D. Nedospasov, et al., "Invasive PUF analysis," in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance
in Cryptography (FDTC), 2013 Workshop on, 2013, pp. 30-38.
[157] J. H. Anderson, "A PUF design for secure FPGA-based embedded systems," in
Proceedings of the 2010 Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference,
2010, pp. 1-6.
[158] D. Suzuki and K. Shimizu, "The glitch PUF: a new delay-PUF architecture
exploiting glitch shapes," in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems,
CHES 2010, ed: Springer, 2010, pp. 366-382.

120

[159] K. Shimizu, et al., "Glitch PUF: extracting information from usually unwanted
glitches," IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications
and Computer Sciences, vol. 95, pp. 223-233, 2012.
[160] D. Yamamoto, et al., "Performance and security evaluation of AES s-box-based
glitch PUFs on FPGAs," in Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography
Engineering, ed: Springer, 2012, pp. 45-62.
[161] S. Devadas, "Non-networked RFID-PUF authentication," US8683210 B2, 2014.
[162] J. Kong, et al., "PUFatt: Embedded Platform Attestation Based on Novel
Processor-Based PUFs," in Proceedings of the The 51st Annual Design
Automation Conference on Design Automation Conference, 2014, pp. 1-6.
[163] M. Majzoobi, et al., "Techniques for design and implementation of secure
reconfigurable PUFs," ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and
Systems (TRETS), vol. 2, pp. 5:1-33, 2009.
[164] M. Majzoobi and F. Koushanfar, "Time-bounded authentication of FPGAs,"
Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 6, pp. 1123-1135,
2011.
[165] M. Potkonjak and V. Goudar, "Public physical unclonable functions,"
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 102, pp. 1142-1156, 2014.
[166] N. Beckmann and M. Potkonjak, "Hardware-based public-key cryptography with
public physically unclonable functions," in Information Hiding, 2009, pp. 206220.
[167] S. Meguerdichian and M. Potkonjak, "Matched public PUF: ultra low energy
security platform," in Proceedings of the 17th IEEE/ACM international
symposium on Low-power electronics and design, 2011, pp. 45-50.
[168] J. Rajendran, et al., "Nano-PPUF: A Memristor-based Security Primitive," in
VLSI (ISVLSI), 2012 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on, 2012, pp.
84-87.
[169] J. B. Wendt and M. Potkonjak, "Nanotechnology-based trusted remote sensing,"
in Sensors, 2011 IEEE, 2011, pp. 1213-1216.
[170] U. Rührmair, "SIMPL Systems: On a Public Key Variant of Physical Unclonable
Functions," IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2009, 2009.
[171] U. Rührmair, et al., "Towards electrical, integrated implementations of SIMPL
systems," in Information Security Theory and Practices. Security and Privacy of
Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices, ed: Springer, 2010, pp. 277-292.

121

[172] U. Rührmair, "SIMPL systems, or: can we design cryptographic hardware without
secret key information?," in SOFSEM 2011: Theory and Practice of Computer
Science, ed: Springer, 2011, pp. 26-45.
[173] U. Rührmair, "SIMPL systems as a keyless cryptographic and security primitive,"
in Cryptography and Security: From Theory to Applications, ed: Springer, 2012,
pp. 329-354.
[174] G. K. Contreras, et al., "Secure split-test for preventing ic piracy by untrusted
foundry and assembly," in Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and
Nanotechnology Systems (DFT), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on, 2013,
pp. 196-203.
[175] X. Zhang, et al., "Identification of recovered ICs using fingerprints from a lightweight on-chip sensor," in Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation
Conference, 2012, pp. 703-708.
[176] X. Zhang, et al., "Path-delay fingerprinting for identification of recovered ICs," in
Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT), 2012
IEEE International Symposium on, 2012, pp. 13-18.
[177] N. Tuzzio, et al., "A zero-overhead IC identification technique using clock
sweeping and path delay analysis," in Proceedings of the great lakes symposium
on VLSI, 2012, pp. 95-98.
[178] X. Zhang and M. Tehranipoor, "Design of on-chip lightweight sensors for
effective detection of recycled ICs," Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 22, pp. 1016-1029, 2014.
[179] Y. Zheng, et al., "CACI: Dynamic Current Analysis Towards Robust Recycled
Chip Identification," in Proceedings of the The 51st Annual Design Automation
Conference on Design Automation Conference, 2014, pp. 1-6.
[180] H. Richard, et al., "Point of sale terminal having enhanced security," USA Patent,
2013.
[181] T. A. Kleijne, "Security device for the secure storage of sensitive data,"
4,593,384, 1986.
[182] M. G. Farooq, et al., "Method and structure for implementing secure multichip
modules for encryption applications," USA Patent US7281667 B2, 2007.
[183] R. C. Byrne, "Tamper resistant integrated circuit structure," 5,369,299, 1994.
[184] R. Mori, "Tamper resistant module with logical elements arranged on a substrate
to protect information stored in the same module," 5,309,387, 1994.

122

[185] K. Chan, et al., "Tamper respondent system," US 7,787,256 B2, 2010.
[186] R. K. Cole and J. P. Yakura, "Method and apparatus for protecting functions
imbedded within an integrated circuit from reverse engineering," 5,861,652, 1999.
[187] R. Q. Thornley, et al., "Intrusion detection using a conductive material," US
8,004,419 B2, 2011.
[188] C. J. Knudsen, "Tamper-resistant packaging and approach using magnetically-set
data," US 7,685,438 B2, 2010.
[189] R. N. Das, et al., "Anti-tamper microchip package based on thermal nanofluids or
fluids," US8288857 B2, 2012.
[190] R. R. Katti, et al., "Tamper-resistant MRAM utilizing chemical alteration,"
US8730715 B2, 2014.
[191] S. H. Weingart, "Physical security for the pABYSS system," system, vol. 1, p. 3,
1987.
[192] Defense_Logistics_Agency, "Dna authentication marking on items in fsc 5962,"
D. o. Defense, Ed., ed. Columbus, OH, 2012.
[193] Applied_DNA_Sciences, "Applied DNA Sciences Successfully Marks MissionCritical Microchips for the Department of Defense," ed: applieddnasciences,
2013.
[194] T. Lindahl, "Instability and decay of the primary structure of DNA," Nature, vol.
362, pp. 709-715, 1993.
[195] SIA, "Public Comments - DNA Authentication Marking on Items in FSC5962,"
Semiconductor Industry Association2012.
[196] G. O. Reynolds, et al., The new physical optics notebook: Tutorials in Fourier
optics vol. 61: SPIE Optical Engineering Press New York, 1989.
[197] M. T. Gale, "Replication techniques for diffractive optical elements,"
Microelectronic Engineering, vol. 34, pp. 321-339, 1997.
[198] S. P. McGrew, "Hologram counterfeiting: problems and solutions," in
OE/LASE'90, Los Angeles, CA, 1990, pp. 66-76.
[199] M. Naruse, et al., "Optical security based on near-field processes at the
nanoscale," Journal of Optics, vol. 14, pp. 094002-94014, 2012.
[200] B. L. Gassend, "Physical random functions," Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2003.

123

[201] P. Tuyls and B. Škorić, "Physical Unclonable Functions for enhanced security of
tokens and tags," in ISSE 2006—Securing Electronic Busines Processes, ed:
Springer, 2006, pp. 30-37.
[202] P. Tuyls and B. Škorić, "Strong authentication with physical unclonable
functions," in Security, Privacy, and Trust in Modern Data Management, ed:
Springer, 2007, pp. 133-148.
[203] U. Rührmair, et al., "Optical PUFs Reloaded," IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2013/2152013.
[204] A. D. Hart, et al., "Card authentication system," US8447991 B2, 2013.
[205] R. S. Indeck and M. W. Muller, "Method and apparatus for secure data storage
and manipulation using magnetic media," US5625689 A, 1997.
[206] MagTek. Available: http://www.magneprint.com/
[207] R. E. Morley Jr, et al., "Method and apparatus for authenticating a magnetic
fingerprint signal using an adaptive analog to digital converter," US7210627 B2,
2007.
[208] L. S. Slaughter, et al., "Effects of symmetry breaking and conductive contact on
the plasmon coupling in gold nanorod dimers," Acs Nano, vol. 4, pp. 4657-4666,
2010.
[209] C. Kuemin, et al., "Oriented Assembly of Gold Nanorods on the Single‐Particle
Level," Advanced Functional Materials, vol. 22, pp. 702-708, 2012.
[210] P. Tuyls and L. Batina, "RFID-tags for Anti-Counterfeiting," in Topics in
Cryptology–CT-RSA 2006, ed: Springer, 2006, pp. 115-131.
[211] R. Want, "An introduction to RFID technology," Pervasive Computing, IEEE,
vol. 5, pp. 25-33, 2006.
[212] S. Shepard, RFID: radio frequency identification: McGraw-Hill New York, 2005.
[213] C. M. Roberts, "Radio frequency identification (RFID)," Computers & Security,
vol. 25, pp. 18-26, 2006.
[214] L. Bolotnyy and G. Robins, "Physically unclonable function-based security and
privacy in RFID systems," in Pervasive Computing and Communications, 2007.
PerCom'07. Fifth Annual IEEE International Conference on, 2007, pp. 211-220.
[215] S. Devadas, et al., "Design and Implementation of PUF-Based "Unclonable"
RFID ICs for Anti-Counterfeiting and Security Applications," in RFID, 2008
IEEE International Conference on, 2008, pp. 58-64.

124

[216] Y. Jin, et al., "PUF-Based RFID authentication protocol against secret key
leakage," in Web Technologies and Applications, ed: Springer, 2012, pp. 318-329.
[217] L. Kulseng, et al., "Lightweight mutual authentication and ownership transfer for
RFID systems," in INFOCOM, 2010 Proceedings IEEE, 2010, pp. 1-5.
[218] D. Ranasinghe, et al., "Security and privacy: Modest proposals for low-cost RFID
systems," in Auto-ID Labs Research Workshop Zurich, Switzerland, 2004.
[219] P. Tuyls, et al., "Read-proof hardware from protective coatings," in
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2006, ed: Springer,
2006, pp. 369-383.
[220] B. Skoric, et al., "Information-theoretic analysis of capacitive physical unclonable
functions," Journal of Applied physics, vol. 100, p. 024902, 2006.
[221] B. Skoric, et al., "Experimental hardware for coating PUFs and optical PUFs," in
Security with Noisy Data, ed: Springer, 2007, pp. 255-268.
[222] S. Bhansali, et al., "3D heterogeneous sensor system on a chip for defense and
security applications," in Defense and Security, 2004, pp. 413-424.
[223] D. L. Lewis and H.-H. Lee, "A scanisland based design enabling prebond
testability in die-stacked microprocessors," in Test Conference, 2007. ITC 2007.
IEEE International, 2007, pp. 1-8.
[224] V. K. Jain, et al., "A highly reconfigurable computing array: DSP plane of a 3D
heterogeneous SoC," in SOC Conference, 2005. Proceedings. IEEE International,
2005, pp. 243-246.
[225] G. H. Chapman, et al., "Defect avoidance in a 3-D heterogeneous sensor
[acoustic/seismic/active pixel/IR imaging sensor array]," in Defect and Fault
Tolerance in VLSI Systems, 2004. DFT 2004. Proceedings. 19th IEEE
International Symposium on, 2004, pp. 67-75.
[226] D. L. Lewis, et al., "High performance non-blocking switch design in 3D diestacking technology," in VLSI, 2009. ISVLSI'09. IEEE Computer Society Annual
Symposium on, 2009, pp. 25-30.
[227] G. H. Chapman, et al., "Inter-plane via defect detection using the sensor plane in
3D heterogeneous sensor systems," in Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI
Systems, 2005. DFT 2005. 20th IEEE International Symposium on, 2005, pp. 158166.
[228] V. Jain and G. H. Chapman, "Defect tolerant and energy economized DSP plane
of a 3-D heterogeneous SoC," in Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems,
2006. DFT'06. 21st IEEE International Symposium on, 2006, pp. 157-165.
125

[229] V. K. Jain and G. H. Chapman, "Massively deployable intelligent sensors for the
smart power grid," in Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems (DFT), 2010
IEEE 25th International Symposium on, 2010, pp. 319-327.
[230] S. Bhansali, et al., "Inter-layer vias and TESH interconnection network for 3-D
heterogeneous sensor system on a chip," in Proc. of SPIE Vol, 2005, p. 307.
[231] V. K. Jain and G. H. Chapman, "Enhanced Defect Tolerance Through Matrixed
Deployment of Intelligent Sensors for the Smart Power Grid," in Defect and Fault
Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT), 2011 IEEE International
Symposium on, 2011, pp. 235-242.
[232] L. Jiang, et al., "Layout-driven test-architecture design and optimization for 3D
SoCs under pre-bond test-pin-count constraint," in Proceedings of the 2009
International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, 2009, pp. 191-196.
[233] E. J. Marinissen, et al., "A structured and scalable test access architecture for
TSV-based 3D stacked ICs," in VLSI Test Symposium (VTS), 2010 28th, 2010, pp.
269-274.
[234] X. Wu, et al., "Test-access mechanism optimization for core-based threedimensional SOCs," Microelectronics Journal, vol. 41, pp. 601-615, 2010.
[235] L. Jiang, et al., "Test architecture design and optimization for three-dimensional
SoCs," in Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in
Europe, 2009, pp. 220-225.
[236] E. Jovanov, et al., "A wireless body area network of intelligent motion sensors for
computer assisted physical rehabilitation," Journal of NeuroEngineering and
rehabilitation, vol. 2, p. 6, 2005.
[237] A. Milenković, et al., "Wireless sensor networks for personal health monitoring:
Issues and an implementation," Computer communications, vol. 29, pp. 25212533, 2006.
[238] M. Li, et al., "Data security and privacy in wireless body area networks," Wireless
Communications, IEEE, vol. 17, pp. 51-58, 2010.
[239] H. Ng, et al., "Security issues of wireless sensor networks in healthcare
applications," BT Technology Journal, vol. 24, pp. 138-144, 2006.
[240] M. Al Ameen, et al., "Security and privacy issues in wireless sensor networks for
healthcare applications," Journal of medical systems, vol. 36, pp. 93-101, 2012.
[241] H. Cao, et al., "Enabling technologies for wireless body area networks: A survey
and outlook," Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 47, pp. 84-93, 2009.

126

[242] M. Patel and J. Wang, "Applications, challenges, and prospective in emerging
body area networking technologies," Wireless Communications, IEEE, vol. 17,
pp. 80-88, 2010.
[243] Y.-M. Huang, et al., "Pervasive, secure access to a hierarchical sensor-based
healthcare monitoring architecture in wireless heterogeneous networks," Selected
Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 27, pp. 400-411, 2009.
[244] S. Lim, et al., "Security issues on wireless body area network for remote
healthcare monitoring," in Sensor Networks, Ubiquitous, and Trustworthy
Computing (SUTC), 2010 IEEE International Conference on, 2010, pp. 327-332.
[245] M. Chen, et al., "Body area networks: A survey," Mobile Networks and
Applications, vol. 16, pp. 171-193, 2011.
[246] B. Latré, et al., "A survey on wireless body area networks," Wireless Networks,
vol. 17, pp. 1-18, 2011.
[247] P. S. Hall and Y. Hao, "Antennas and propagation for body centric
communications," in Antennas and Propagation, 2006. EuCAP 2006. First
European Conference on, 2006, pp. 1-7.
[248] S. Ullah, et al., "A comprehensive survey of wireless body area networks,"
Journal of medical systems, vol. 36, pp. 1065-1094, 2012.
[249] L. Howard, et al., "Real-time displacement measurements with a Fabry-Perot
cavity and a diode laser," Precision Engineering, vol. 25, pp. 321-335, 2001.
[250] Y. Bitou, et al., "Accurate wide-range displacement measurement using tunable
diode laser and optical frequency comb generator," Optics Express, vol. 14, pp.
644-654, 2006.
[251] J.-Y. Lee, et al., "Optical heterodyne grating interferometry for displacement
measurement with subnanometric resolution," Sensors and Actuators A: Physical,
vol. 137, pp. 185-191, 2007.
[252] C.-C. Hsu, et al., "Reflection type heterodyne grating interferometry for in-plane
displacement measurement," Optics Communications, vol. 281, pp. 2582-2589,
2008.
[253] H. Hsieh, et al., "Quasi-common-optical-path heterodyne grating interferometer
for displacement measurement," Measurement science and technology, vol. 21, p.
115304, 2010.
[254] S. Zhao, et al., "Nanometer-scale displacement sensor based on phase-sensitive
diffraction grating," Applied Optics, vol. 50, pp. 1413-1416, 2011.

127

[255] K. Yee, "Numerical solution of initial boundary value problems involving
Maxwell's equations in isotropic media," Antennas and Propagation, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 14, pp. 302-307, 1966.
[256] C.-H. Chen, et al., "Compact and integrated TM-pass waveguide polarizer," Opt.
Express, vol. 13, pp. 5347-5352, 2005.
[257] O. Mitomi, et al., "Design of a single-mode tapered waveguide for low-loss chipto-fiber coupling," Quantum Electronics, IEEE Journal of, vol. 30, pp. 17871793, 1994.
[258] V. R. Almeida, et al., "Nanotaper for compact mode conversion," Optics letters,
vol. 28, pp. 1302-1304, 2003.
[259] A. Pozo, et al., "FDTD analysis of the light propagation in the cones of the human
retina: an approach to the Stiles–Crawford effect of the first kind," Journal Of
Optics A: Pure And Applied Optics, vol. 7, p. 357, 2005.
[260] F. Lacour, et al., "Nanostructuring Optical Waveguides by Focused Ion Beam
Milling. Near-Field Characterization," arXiv preprint arXiv:0801.4062, 2008.
[261] C.-C. Chiu and D.-W. Huang, "Polarization independent grating coupler for
silicon-on-insulator waveguides," in Optical MEMS and Nanophotonics (OPT
MEMS), 2010 International Conference on, 2010, pp. 171-172.
[262] H. Levinson, "SPIE Handbook of Microlithography, Micromachining and
Microfabrication," The Society for Photo-optical Instrumentation Engineers,
United States of America, 1997.
[263] Y. H. Lee, et al., "Low voltage alternative for electron beam lithography,"
Journal of Vacuum Science & Technology B, vol. 10, pp. 3094-3098, 1992.
[264] G. Brewer, Electron-beam technology in microelectronic fabrication: Elsevier,
2012.
[265] M. Kamp, et al., "Nanolithography using a 100 kV electron beam lithography
system with a Schottky emitter," Journal of Vacuum Science & Technology B,
vol. 17, pp. 86-89, 1999.
[266] A. Speth, et al., "Electron‐beam lithography using vector‐scan techniques,"
Journal of Vacuum Science and Technology, vol. 12, pp. 1235-1239, 1975.
[267] H. Seiler, "Secondary electron emission in the scanning electron microscope,"
Journal of Applied physics, vol. 54, pp. R1-R18, 1983.
[268] P. Rai-Choudhury, Handbook of microlithography, micromachining, and
microfabrication: microlithography vol. 1: Iet, 1997.

128

[269] B. Wu and A. R. Neureuther, "Energy deposition and transfer in electron-beam
lithography," Journal of Vacuum Science & Technology B, vol. 19, pp. 25082511, 2001.
[270] A. Broers, et al., "Electron beam lithography—Resolution limits,"
Microelectronic Engineering, vol. 32, pp. 131-142, 1996.
[271] J. Orloff, et al., High Resolution Focused Ion Beams: FIB and its Applications:
Fib and Its Applications: The Physics of Liquid Metal Ion Sources and Ion Optics
and Their Application to Focused Ion Beam Technology: Springer Science &
Business Media, 2003.
[272] F. Schiappelli, et al., "Efficient fiber-to-waveguide coupling by a lens on the end
of the optical fiber fabricated by focused ion beam milling," Microelectronic
Engineering, vol. 73, pp. 397-404, 2004.
[273] Y.-Q. Fu, et al., "Microfabrication of microlens array by focused ion beam
technology," Microelectronic Engineering, vol. 54, pp. 211-221, 2000.
[274] H. Lohmeyer, et al., "Resonant modes in monolithic nitride pillar microcavities,"
The European Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, vol.
48, pp. 291-294, 2005.
[275] S.-J. Kim, et al., "Characteristics of two-stacked intrinsic Josephson junctions
with a submicron loop on a Bi 2 Sr 2 CaCu 2 O 8+ δ (Bi-2212) single crystal
whisker," Physica C: Superconductivity, vol. 412, pp. 1401-1405, 2004.
[276] T. M. Babinec, et al., "Design and focused ion beam fabrication of single crystal
diamond nanobeam cavities," Journal of Vacuum Science & Technology B, vol.
29, p. 010601, 2011.
[277] I. Bayn, et al., "Processing of photonic crystal nanocavity for quantum
information in diamond," Diamond and Related Materials, vol. 20, pp. 937-943,
2011.
[278] J. Ingino, et al., "Workpiece charging in electron beam lithography," Journal of
Vacuum Science & Technology B, vol. 12, pp. 1367-1371, 1994.
[279] M.-a. Kurihara, et al., "Primary processes in e-beam and laser lithographies for
phase-shift mask manufacturing II," in Photomask Technology, 1993, pp. 50-61.
[280] C. A. Kondek and L. C. Poli, "Submicron e-beam lithography process using an
overcoating conducting polymer for the reduction of beam charging effects on
lithium niobate and quartz," in SPIE's 1994 Symposium on Microlithography,
1994, pp. 366-374.

129

[281] O. Mata-Mendez and F. Chavez-Rivas, "Diffraction of Gaussian and Hermite–
Gaussian beams by finite gratings," JOSA A, vol. 18, pp. 537-545, 2001.
[282] J. M. Bendickson, et al., "Guided-mode resonant subwavelength gratings: effects
of finite beams and finite gratings," JOSA A, vol. 18, pp. 1912-1928, 2001.
[283] S.-D. Wu and E. N. Glytsis, "Finite-number-of-periods holographic gratings with
finite-width incident beams: analysis using the finite-difference frequency-domain
method," JOSA A, vol. 19, pp. 2018-2029, 2002.
[284] J. Sumaya-Martinez, et al., "Rigorous theory of the diffraction of Gaussian beams
by finite gratings: TE polarization," JOSA A, vol. 20, pp. 827-835, 2003.
[285] D. Peters, et al., "Effect of finite grating, waveguide width, and end-facet
geometry on resonant subwavelength grating reflectivity," JOSA A, vol. 21, pp.
981-987, 2004.
[286] OptiFDTD User's Reference: OptiWave.
[287] H. D. Young and R. A. Freedman, Sears and Zemansky's university physics vol.
1: Pearson education, 2008.
[288] G. Oster, et al., "Theoretical interpretation of moiré patterns," JOSA, vol. 54, pp.
169-175, 1964.
[289] B. Prenitzer, et al., "Transmission electron microscope specimen preparation of
Zn powders using the focused ion beam lift-out technique," Metallurgical and
Materials Transactions A, vol. 29, pp. 2399-2406, 1998.
[290] C. Lehrer, et al., "Limitations of focused ion beam nanomachining," Journal of
Vacuum Science & Technology B, vol. 19, pp. 2533-2538, 2001.
[291] L. Frey, et al., "Nanoscale effects in focused ion beam processing," Applied
Physics A, vol. 76, pp. 1017-1023, 2003.
[292] T. Ishitani, et al., "Transmission electron microscope sample preparation using a
focused ion beam," Journal of Electron Microscopy, vol. 43, pp. 322-326, 1994.

130

VITA
ANGE MARIE PATRICIA FIEVRE
Born, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
1997-2003

B.S., Electronic Engineering
Université d'Etat d'Haïti
Port-au-Prince, Haiti

2004-2005

Teaching Assistant
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
The Chancellor's List

2004-2006

M.S., Computer Engineering
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) scholarship

2006-2015

Doctoral Candidate
Florida International University
Miami, Florida

2008

Electrical Engineering Intern III
Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp.
Westminster, Colorado

2009

Electrical Engineering Intern
General Electric Global research Center
Niskayuna, New York

2010

SPIE Educational Scholarship

2012-2014

McKnight Doctoral Fellowship

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
Fievre, A.M.P., Liu T., and Panepucci R.R. (2007). Nanotaper coupler for the horizontal
slot-waveguide. Paper presented at NanoScience+Engineering, International Society for
Optics and Photonics, San Diego, California: 66450E.

131

Panepucci, R.R., Almeida, V. R., Wang, X., Lavrenov, A., Fievre, A. M. P. (2006).
Sensing using Nano-Opto-Electromechanical Systems (NOEMS). Emerging Technology
Workshop on Nanotechnologies for Microelectronics.
Fievre, A.M.P., Rogers, A.-A.A. and Bhansali, S. (2014). Effect of beam size, finite
number of lines, and rotational misalignment on coupled subwavelength gratings. JOSA
A, 31 (12): 2603-2609.
Fievre, A.M.P. (2015). Uniquely identifiable tamper-evident device using coupling
between subwavelength gratings. Presented at the McKnight Mid-Year Conference,
Tampa, Florida.
Fievre, A.M.P., Rogers, A.-A.A. and Bhansali, S. (2015). Integrated Circuit Security: An
Overview. Paper submitted upon invitation from ISSS (Institute of Smart Structures and
Systems), Bangalore, India.
Fievre, A.M.P., Rogers, A.-A.A. and Bhansali, S. (2015). Fabrication and Test of
Coupled Subwavelength Gratings for Security Application. Paper in preparation upon
invitation from JoVE (Journal of Visualized Experiments), Cambridge, MA.

132

